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DAVID E. ROBERTS—IN MEMORIAM

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Dave Roberts died on January 4th at his home in Union Theological Seminary. This is an extremely difficult fact to grasp or take in. It is literally and profoundly shocking. For here is one of the brightest and most useful careers in contemporary theology cut off in mid-course—a grievous and irreplaceable loss.

He was, I think, the most fully *representative* theologian of us all. For, in the twenty years of his working life it was his destiny to be in significant contact with almost every major theological development in this country. His student years at Union Theological Seminary (B.D., '34) and Edinburgh (Ph.D., '36) were a kind of Indian Summer for "Liberal Theology." The basic temper and shape of Dave's mind were established in the atmos-

This statement was originally prepared for the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, of which David Roberts had been a Fellow since 1935. In the event of the death of a Fellow, it is the custom of the Council to distribute to its membership a memorial statement written by another Fellow who knew him well. Dr. Outler and the Council have kindly consented to our publication of this tribute to Dr. Roberts.

A volume of Dr. Roberts' sermons will be published by Oxford University Press this fall.

phere dominated by William Adams Brown, Eugene Lyman and John Baillie. On the other hand, he helped to make Union one of the American epicenters of the theological earthquake which has been rumbling along, off and on, for a quarter of a century—and which has so unsettled things that it is now hard for the old-timer to recollect the theological atmosphere of the early Thirties without distortion, and quite impossible to tell the upcoming generation how it really was. Dave worked constantly and closely with Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich; indeed, he had a unique gift for understanding and interpreting them, sometimes more effectively than they could do themselves.

He was always working out at the edges and boundaries of the theological field. He was one of the very first, and very few, to acquire a really adequate background for understanding and appraising psychotherapy in the light of the Christian faith. There is now a busy regiment at work in this field but Dave was one of the true pioneers and his book is still the very best. He was one of the very first theologians in America to take the challenge of Karl Barth seriously, and through his study of Barth he was led to an equally basic study of Kierkegaard. Thus he was ready for the challenge of existentialism as few of his contemporaries were, or are. He was in close touch with the shifts and developments in contemporary philosophy, and one of his most useful services was the liaison he maintained between the philosophers on the east and the theologians on the west of Broadway. There was nothing new in the whole theological world about which he was incurious or content to know at second hand. He reacted to it all, intensely and intelligently, and made all of it into nourishing grist for his students' minds.

He worked very hard—much too hard, as some can say with a touch of smugness and others with a touch of self-pity. Despite his diligence, he didn't get very much down on paper. His basic contribution exists now largely in the deposit of his head and heart in the lives of his students and friends. For all of them, the most vivid and heartwarming memories of Dave are of a wonderful companion and family man. He was one of the most unfailingly kind and understanding persons I have ever known, and the home he and Elly had made was one of the most fully gracious I've ever visited—and this must be the sincere witness of countless others.

There is inevitably deep grief in our memory of Dave's untimely death. There is also some protest over the wastefulness of a system that loses half the harvest of a gifted man. There is unavoidable anxiety which is bound to arise when we try to "accept" or "justify" such a tragic happening. And yet, deeper than all of this, our strongest feeling about Dave is gratitude for having had him to know. He lived and died in an honest faith that life's meaning is not signified by transience and death but by the deed of God in Jesus Christ. "Christ incorporates a universal fact of human existence, when he embodies the inescapable connection between suffering and love; and he also discloses the bearing of faith in God upon the way in which we

cope with whatever suffering may befall us." (This sentence, from page 140 of *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man,* is in the middle of an important passage which could serve appropriately as Dave's testament of Christian hope and confidence.)

I still remember a theological discussion group about five years ago, where our topic was "Death and Resurrection." As usual, Dave was in the thick of the talk as it swung back and forth between those whose "knowledge" seemed a shade too explicit and those who were equally over-explicit in their negative assurance. Finally someone laid down Romans 8:11 and I Cor. 15 and asked us how much of all this an honest man could really believe. As I recall it, Dave's reply was quick and firm: "It is hard for me to assign any literal meaning to the New Testament references to resurrection. But they *are* talking about something profoundly true. I find I still believe in 'resurrection'—and I think it's because it is the one confession of God's sovereign goodness in which Christians take both God's *sovereignty* and His *goodness* with ultimate seriousness."

It is my clear impression that Dave's whole life did just that.

ANXIETY FOR THE LIVING GOD: AN ASPECT OF THE PATHOLOGY OF RELIGION

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I

During the last two decades so-called existential philosophy has shown a penetrating interest in psychological problems, especially in those of psychotherapy. In this context we shall refer to two European existential philosophers who also are psychiatrists, the German Karl Jaspers and the Swiss Ludwig Binswanger.[1]

At the same time there has been an interest also on the part of the psychotherapists in the existential philosophical problems elicited by their field of interest. The names of Erich Fromm and Rollo May might suffice to substantiate that statement.

A mutual give-and-take can therefore be said to be one characteristic of the present relation between psychotherapy and existential philosophy. This is of course not surprising in view of the fact that the roots of psychology are to be found within the field of philosophy.[2]

Although existential philosophy does not constitute one single movement but might rather be described as a pluralistic approach, it moves around a common theme, the problems of "existence." As the existentialists have developed their methods of "philosophizing" there has been a renewed interest in the ontological questions, the problems of being, its structure and relation to the world of beings. At the same time the existentialists use the method of phenomenology applied to the analysis of the questioning self and its situation.

When this philosophical analysis of "existence" is applied to the concrete problems of "beings" the question of "man and fellow man" comes into focus. It is therefore no wonder that in our time the problem of anxiety has become a key problem in this type of philosophy. It is here that the religious aspect of life enters the philosophical scene. The German-born

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[1] *Cf.* also Jean-Paul Sartre: *Existential Psychoanalysis;* New York, The Philosophical Library, 1953, which is a part of his main work, *Being and Nothingness.*

[2] *Cf.* Hanna Colm: "Healing as Participation: Comments Based on Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 16, 1953, pp. 99-111. *Cf.* also Edith Weigert: "Existentialism and Its Relation to Psychotherapy," *Psychiatry,* Vol. 12, 1949, pp. 399-411.

theologian Paul Tillich has most intensively dealt with the problems of anxiety from a theistic existential standpoint and has shown that the questions of existence might be related to the question of that "Ground of being" which is God.[3]

II

What does happen when God encounters man? Within the realm of religion this question touches off, among other things, what we in the preceding paragraphs have described as existential-psychological problems. With this question as a starting point the Swiss physician and psychotherapist Th. Bovet has elaborated what he considers to be "a general pathology of religion." By this phrase he refers not to pathological phenomena appearing in " religious personalities," but rather to "those sicknesses which attack religion as man's living relationship with God."

This pathology of religion Bovet has analyzed in a book as yet not published in this country, *Anxiety for the Living God.*[4] The purpose of this paper is to present Bovet's pathology of religion against the background of his psychological theory of personality and theological concept of man. In this presentation we shall especially examine his understanding of the normal and abnormal functions of fear and anxiety as associated with religious experiences.

Point of Departure

The following is, in the words of Bovet, the general background for his book, which incidentally is one of a series concerning mental hygiene and religion: "I intend to examine possible states of sickness in the religious attitude as such, to try to understand the psychopathological phenomena against the background of the religious situation, and by that to comprehend them themselves as religious phenomena" (p. 13).[5]

Theory of Personality

As Bovet looks upon man he sees him very much as a product of nature with orthodox Freudian emphasis on the biological determinants of the personality make-up. This does not, however, hinder him from recognizing the societal influences on man.

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[3] Paul Tillich: *The Courage to Be;* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952. Paul Tillich: *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I; Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. James Collins: *The Existentialists*: *A Critical Study;* Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1952.

[4] Th. Bovet: *Die Angst vor dem lebendigen Gott;* copyright by Paul Haupt, Bern, 1948.

[5] The quotations in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the Swedish translation of Bovet's book (*Fruktan för Levande Gud;* Stockholm, Natur och Kultur, 1951) and might therefore contain variations from an eventual English translation.

The main thing in Bovet's thinking is that man develops among several extremes, the common element of which is *fear,* the basic and original reaction to life. The first of these extremes is *fear and security,* security being the basic and original need in life.

The model of all security is the total dependency on the parents during infancy. Under the pressure of weakness of personality, inability to cope with oneself and one's environment, adult man, also, escapes into "the infallible criterion of the infantile super-ego" (p. 88). In another context Bovet talks about "the facts of repression and regression" and says: "They are in good agreement with our wish to gain security and rule ourselves" (p. 126).

Therefore: "The history of mankind is the history of a great single struggle to gain security . . . But simultaneously the nature and freedom of personality have been explored more thoroughly and have been put into contrast to the mechanistic conformity to natural laws" (p. 95). Personality development is thus a development away from "instinctual dependency," dominance of "infantile super-ego," that is infantile security. Bovet's second key word, *freedom,* must be understood against this background.

Man swings thus between fear and security (the tendencies toward regression). His development can also be considered under the aspect of *fear and freedom* (the "capacity for growth").

Freedom, independence, the potentiality of "self-determination," is the distinct characteristic of personality development. In the early stages of this development, the "instinctual apparatus" is the basic regulating system for this self-determination. At a later stage, freedom means that individuals "no longer have to chose only by help of habitual instinctual impulses, but are able to do this against the background of a more and more differentiated . . . picture of the external world" (pp. 66-67). At the highest level, freedom means self-realization, "the actualization of our own self, our goal of life, our 'entelechy,' or what we will name this most personal principle of our personality . . ." (p. 67).

Here it is important to keep in mind that freedom essentially is but a postulated possibility. For the twin of freedom is fear. Therefore, the point of complete freedom is also the point of complete fear.

Self-realization and self-conquest: in this unbearable dialectic tension man is likely to put up a false alternative—obedience or disobedience—the result of which is a false consequence—legalism,—compulsive behavior according to stereotyped commands and prohibitions. When this occurs in the religious context God has been identified with the super-ego. An important difference between "the morality of the super-ego" and "the genuine morality of freedom" (p. 86) is that a transgression of a super-ego command results only in *anxiety.*

The question of freedom leads to the question of the relationship of love in personality development. Even here we have to deal with an extreme:

fear and love. For love also has an antipode—the need for power—the root of which is fear.

This has to do with the "unpredictable" kind of relationship which is genuine love. Love "will neither gain power over a fellow-man nor put itself under his power, but will make him free and together with him remain free" (p. 92). Love is therefore essentially the *personal* relationship between human beings. This quality in love is always in danger of distortion. Under the pressure of fear, love might be transformed into that kind of a defense mechanism in which the power relation is the key motive. This is basically an attempt toward *depersonalization,* toward changing a personal relationship into an impersonal, predictable one.

In these aspects of personality development we have encountered *fear and anxiety* as a basic common element. Bovet makes the usual differentiation between fear, which is identified with reactions to external threats, and anxiety, which results from "external or internal inhibition, accumulation or repression of instinctual energy and with the connected affects" (p. 27). Neurotic anxiety is essentially of this kind.

Bovet mentions also a second type of anxiety which arises "when we transgress the limits of the instinctual guaranties and enter that area where we can choose between different possibilities" (p. 28), and he concludes: "As man outgrows the instinctual determination and wants to live in freedom, he must accept fear as the remaining tension and must not give in to it. To the degree he gives in to his fear he becomes neurotic" (p. 29).

In various ways man is trying to overcome his fears and anxieties. Seldom is it done in that mature reaction which is *courage*: "to go one's way *in spite of the experienced fear*" (p. 31). Most of the time it is done through some mechanism of defense. This defensive distortion of personality development is summed up as *repression and regression,* repression being the more basic of the two. "Repression of instinctual needs . . . is the psychological process in which resistance against our development expresses itself. And regression to an earlier instinctual level is its result" (p. 123).

Bovet takes account of the fact that not only sexual drives can be repressed, although they are a very important aspect of repression and regression. He says: "Repression occurs not only to the sexual drive, but to a certain degree to all instinctual functions . . ." (p. 124). He seems to have in mind a general repression of all positive life impulses, resembling what Anna Freud has called "ego restriction."

The Concept of Man

In Bovet's theological understanding of man, his understanding of the basic reaction of fear in interplay with the defense mechanisms of repression and regression plays an important role. Before we go into this problem, however, we must make some mention of his concept of God.

Fear is, we have said, the spontaneous reaction to everything that is completely new to us. This is true also in the encounter with God. For God is essentially the Unknown One who makes himself known to us, who encounters us. On the whole, Bovet is here in agreement with so-called continental theology and quotes, among others, Emil Brunner: "God's revelation is, if looked at from the viewpoint of the absolute, non-revelatory 'majestas,' a gracious hiding of this majesty . . ." (p. 33).

The encounter with God thus implies a certain amount of fear and anxiety. In this context Bovet strongly advocates Rudolf Otto's psychologically oriented phenomenology of the religious experience as set forth in his book, *The Idea of the Holy*. Two quotations may clarify what Bovet has in mind:

> The religious experience refers to something, but often one cannot say anything further than that this something is Something. In order that man at all shall be able to make any statements about this Something it must penetrate to him, encounter him as something else than he himself. The first thing we can say about the object of religion is therefore, that it is something strikingly Otherwise . . . This strikingly Otherwise Rudolf Otto has, as known, designed as the "numinous" with a quality of "mysterium tremendum." The feeling reaction to this is expressed pictorially by the Greek word "thambos" (= amazement, wonder, dread, awe). (p. 16)
>
> The religious experience (thus) means man's encounter with the "Absolute Other," with the "Numinous," which in relation to that for him known life-context is transcendent. Phenomenologically this encounter results in amazement, wonder, in the feeling of being overwhelmed, and this results immediately in a certain behavior: man's response to the "address" of the numinous. (p. 25)

The tension-creating factor in this situation is that man cannot simply get rid of this fear by avoiding the religious experience. For:

> Man needs this encounter with the numinous, for it is this encounter that gives his life vigor and meaning . . . But at the same time this encounter induces in him fear, for it calls into question again and again his very existence and his whole earthly order of life, and he wants most of all to have some guaranty against this calling into question. (p. 25)

How does man react to this encounter? First, another question: How *can* he react? Bovet's thesis is that man ideally can receive the revelation from God which expresses itself in the religious experience in an attitude of confidence and trust. "The revelation is God's act of love, and this man can receive only by returning this his love . . . a knowledge of the same kind as when love is known in love and not otherwise. This very knowledge in love is called *faith*" (p. 160).

The developmental aspects of personality—freedom and love—are counteracted, as we have seen, by fear and anxiety under the pressure of the need for security. As it is in the general development of personality, so it is also in the religious dimension of this development. What is so difficult for

man is—under the pressure of detrimental personality development in addition to the "thambos" of the religious experience—to accept trustfully this experience, to let himself be overwhelmed by it and guided by it in his daily life. In other words, what is so difficult is courageously to face the "tremendum" of this experience together with its aspect of "fascinosum."

The deep anxiety-creating element in this situation is that man cannot grow in freedom and love—the very meaning of his life—without at the same time perpetually encountering that kind of non-neurotic fear and anxiety which is at the very bottom of life itself. What we have said so far about the psychological and religious aspects of personality development is the background for what Bovet has to say about the potential sickness of religion.

The Pathology and Cure of Religion

When Bovet talks about "sickness" there are two things we must necessarily keep in mind. First, he has a "structural" understanding of sickness. He includes in this term all the abnormal reactions of the whole organism or parts of it to the cause of the specific disease. Sickness is thus not a state but an actual process of disturbances of the vital functions. At the same time that sickness is a sign of a threatened existence, it is a sign of the struggle against the threat.

Secondly, Bovet reminds us that sickness is a concept of value and not a scientific term in the statistical meaning. For the correlate to "sickness" is not "normality" but "health," the ideal state of the organism.

Transferred to psychopathology, "sickness" means "a disturbance of, or a threat against, the psychic structure and its creative abilities, but simultaneously also *the struggle against the cause to this disturbance*" (p. 14).

When sickness takes the upper hand, the result is disintegration organically or psychologically, a disruption of the structural unity. In this meaning, sickness is thus a more or less radical disturbance of a "relationship." The result of an ongoing process of sickness is thus, if not complete disintegration, nonetheless a regression to more primitive levels. We observe this within the organic realm as recovery with remaining defects. We find this in a personality disturbance as regression to more primitive, instinctual levels, and to compulsive mechanisms. We find this, lastly, in the disturbance of interpersonal relationships. A marital relation—the example is taken from Bovet—can become sick and regress to more primitive levels, as plain instinctual relationship and satisfaction, conventional unity, mutual demands for possession, and so on.

In this last meaning, Bovet applies the concept of sickness also to the religious life. The "I-Thou relationship" can be disturbed, the religious function can become sick. In the understanding of sickness as a disturbed relationship, Bovet makes a specific contribution which he then tries to apply to the pathology of religion. According to him, the sickness of the

relationship and the sickness of the elements of this relationship must be sharply distinguished from each other.

Therefore, we have to distinguish between the sickness of, for instance, a marital relationship per se and the eventual personality disturbances of husband and wife having this relation. The same is true also within the religious sphere:

> A per se healthy person, by taking over a complex-determined idea about God from the parents, can get an unhealthy religion . . . On the other hand, a neurotic or other psychopathic person can have a healthy relation with God and in this relation even experience the healing of the neurosis. Even if severely neurotic individuals as a rule have a distorted religious life, yes, even if their neurosis very often takes the most fantastic expression within the very religious sphere, we have nevertheless principally to distinguish between the personal sickness and the sick religious relationship. (p. 19)

The background for this potential sickness of the religious relationship is the general tension between the reaction of fear and the need for security in life. This means that, "if man out of fear for God hides himself, or if he tries to pull God down to his own level, his religion is sick" (p. 26). In the tension between the "fascinosum" and the "tremendum" of the religious experience man becomes a victim of the defense mechanisms of his personality.

> The cure of the religious sickness we find . . . always in the encounter with the living God as he "absconditus" reveals himself, in contrast to all guaranties and defense attitudes demanded and dictated by our fear. Also here, the liberating attitude is that courage which in spite of fear seeks God. (p. 35)

Now we can state Bovet's understanding of the task of the pathology of religion. Its task is to investigate "to what degree man through this God's descending really succeeds in overcoming his fear and accepts the encounter with God, and to what degree he, in spite of this God's interference, remains in his state of fear and entrenches himself behind some form of observance" (pp. 34-35).

III

In Part I of this paper we have stated the larger framework within which we have chosen to understand Bovet. In this last part we shall attempt an evaluation and offer a tentative interpretation of his writing, which we have presented in outline.

Evaluation

Bovet's specific contribution is his thinking concerning the pathology and cure of religion. He has tried in a constructive way to relate consequently and dynamically an analytic theory of personality with a theological concept of man. With his theory of personality and concept of man thus stated, he has chosen to lay the emphasis on the encounter or the relationship between

man and that which manifests itself to him as transcending his life—the religious aspect of man's life and its pathology.

As Bovet clearly states, there is definitely an anxiety which is exclusively neurotic in kind. But man also experiences anxiety of a type that ought to be labeled "normal" and—involving his total being—"existential." This experience of "existential anxiety" which man has when he goes beyond the boundaries of his "world-of-experience," when he is facing unknown dimensions of his inner and outer world, has a "more-than-psychological" aspect and is an integral part of the religious experience itself.

The overcoming of the religious pathological conditions of life is, as a process, expressed as *courageousness*: to "stand" the "existential anxiety," to live without security guaranties. As Bovet speaks about the pathology of religion as a disturbed relationship, we can also express the way of cure in those terms: to experience something in the encounter with God which gives man confidence and trust so he can give himself up to his experiences in spite of the anxiety for the Unknown which they imply.

Here, however, we must make a criticism of Bovet. In many ways his theory of personality and his concept of man remind us of Harry Stack Sullivan's concept of personality development as "interpersonal relationships." But when he then says, for instance, that he can distinguish between the sickness of a marriage per se and the eventual personality disturbances of husband and wife, we shall ask if he has not overlooked the inevitable consequences, the mutualities of "interpersonal relationships." And when Bovet talks about the cure of religion as confrontation with "the living God," we wonder if he has not forgotten what he has stated so clearly in other contexts when treating the origin of religious disturbances—namely, that they are determined by defense mechanisms developed in the interpersonal relations of infancy. Must not "the living God" and the health-giving encounter with him in some way be *mediated through interpersonal relationships,* as was "the morbid God?"

A Tentative Interpretation

It seems safe to say that from the 20's to the present there has been a move in the understanding of the basic correlation from that of religion-neurosis to that of religion-anxiety.

The religious experience itself implies a certain amount of anxiety. For in this experience man is confronted with the quest for "transcendence," to abandon old security guaranties—go beyond them (Bovet). This quality in the religious experience of the Unknown is expressed in phenomenological terms as the "mysterium-tremendum-et-fascinosum" aspect (Otto).

The "mysterium quality" of the religious experience is an aspect of a more general experience of anxiety inherent in our very existence. This is the reaction to the precarious situation of human life, that we in every moment of our life face a potential and ultimate powerlessness (Horney),

existentially in the form of death, spiritually in the form of meaninglessness, morally in the form of guilt (Tillich).

In the religious life we find a cultivation of the polarity between our ultimate powerlessness and the urge for transcendence. On the one hand, those already struggling with this problem might find in religion a way of tackling it. On the other hand, religion can serve as a "reminder" of a more or less inarticulate urge for psychological-spiritual "growth": a deepened self-awareness—greater individualization; an enlarging of one's world of relatedness—more relevant participation. In this capacity religion can be an instigator of "existential anxiety" (Tillich).

That religion—among other things—has this function in the life of man constitutes its precarious situation. Its potential pathology lies in the fact that it becomes dominated and overtaken by people whose existential anxiety is intermingled with and distorted by neurotic anxiety. We can fruitfully look upon neuroticized religion as a disturbance of "the Divine-human encounter" (Brunner). But pastoral psychology is put into an undefendable position if it, in line with Bovet, understands this distorted relationship as an independent one which can be treated in separation from other interpersonal relations.

It seems therefore that both the pathology of religion and the cure which it offers are problems psychologically (Sullivan) and theologically (Tillich) of interpersonal relations. In this formulation are included wide ranges of interrelations—from the intimate family circle to the worldwide fellowship, from contemporary significant persons to those of the faraway past, from actually living people to imagined persons.

Although it is a truism, it is important to say that man does have experiences with psychologically significant persons also in adult life, and that they are, for better or worse, not sheer repetitions of childhood patterns, however influential those might have been. Whether these persons are to be found in the small family circle or within large groups, whether they are contemporary or not, living or ideational, their psychological significance must be *mediated* through some person or persons.

Then we can finally state that the pathology of religion is the inability to form within the religious sphere of life, in all its aspects, relevant relationships, an inability which we can expect to find as a general trend of "estrangement" (Horney). Functionally, this alienation from the world of relatedness is an attempt, on the basis of emotional vulnerability, to avoid *all* anxiety. Hence the peculiar flatness, the lack of depth, in the religious life of people thus affected.

The cure which religion offers can be expressed as *"courageousness"* (Bovet, Tillich). It must, however, always be mediated through somebody who, for the time being, becomes psychologically significant. The ultimate goal is the affirmation of one's own self in spite of the threat of existential anxiety. This might mean that the cure of religion has to be accompanied by a cure from neurosis.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAITH TO SEXUAL MORALITY

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The problem discussed in this paper is one of the many raised by the Kinsey Report. Three aspects of the problem will be considered: (1) the relevance and validity of a moral structure, (2) the meaning of a moral structure in relation to our faith, and (3) the significance of our faith in relation to a moral structure and to our whole lives.

The Relevance and Validity of a Moral Structure

A short time ago, as I was talking with a young and sensitive newspaper woman, the Kinsey Report came up as a subject which had made a great splash in the press and in the minds of the people. She very seriously said something like this: The Jewish Christian moral structure makes its laws too high for a normal person to obey. It is just out of a person's reach. What we need is a modified ethic, something that will fit people as they are. She went on to say that she and others whom she knew had, in effect, supplied this needed modified ethic in their own lives because it was the only practical way to live.

If the question raised by her comment is a universal one, then a serious blow has been dealt to the kind of religious liberalism which seeks to turn daily life into a YMCA picnic. It undermines ethical societies which believe that if you educate yourself in the "Great Books" and appreciate string quartets you are really facing life. Young people, I believe, are asking an honest question when they say, "Why should I obey an impossible ethic?" People grant our moral tradition a certain authority because of the force of our past, but when it comes down to their day-to-day lives they feel that "Jesus and the Ten Commandments" aren't practical.

The problem of a realistic moral code is a question raised by the Kinsey Report. His description of life goes something like this: There are two faces to society, the overt face and the covert face. Man pays lip service to the institutions of overt society. He believes that he lives under the Judeo-Christian moral structure, for the Judeo-Christian moral law permeates our religious, judicial, and educational institutions. However, real life takes place in covert society where man, whom Kinsey treats as a species of Mammalia, acts in defiance of the moral law. Nevertheless, moral law has influence and it permeates man's actions so deeply that it prevents the

untrammeled expression of his biological needs. In other words, overt society, with its Judeo-Christian moral law, only serves to make him feel guilty about the way he behaves.

For example, from *The Sexual Behavior of the Human Female* (p. 433), a typical story might go like this: If, before marriage, a woman acts in courage to break the moral code and accepts the guilt which comes from a premarital sexual experience, this has a great influence on the rest of her life. His figures show that, when she does marry, she will probably have a better physical relationship with her husband and will also feel less uncomfortable about extra-marital experiences. If there is trouble in her marriage because of such extra-marital experience, he says, it does not come from the experience itself but from the spouse's *knowledge* of it. Strong-minded people will order their sex lives in such a way that their spouses do not know of such relationships unless, of course—he adds—they have strong-minded spouses who can accept such activity. If a moral issue is raised, say the issue of deceit or the integrity of the marriage relationship, elsewhere in the book he describes it as a rationalization of the male need to completely possess the female. He points to examples among deer and porcupine to substantiate his point.

He further points out that our laws are based upon an impossible and unreal understanding of man and treat the sexual offender too severely. He indicates that law should be made to reflect the way the majority of people act rather than to reflect an absolutistic ideal.

Kinsey, like the newspaper woman and her friends, is questioning the relevance of the moral structure to human life and need. He implies a challenge to the guardian of the moral structure, the Church, to justify itself in the face of this reality. He and the girl, like many others, believe that the Church is a sleeping relic speaking its message in dead words, dead literature, dead symbols. They see its membership learning manners instead of living the moral life they profess. They see its leadership divided into two groups—fanatically cruel men who proclaim a message of hell and condemnation and men who are perpetually charming and fear taking stands because to take a stand is to be controversial. T. S. Eliot describes the modern Church as the only animal that eats and sleeps at one and the same time. To such people the Church is the last institution to be thought of as the vehicle of the New Age. They believe this archaic institution has little to say to "modern man." The prevailing philosophy echoed by them says that through *science* we know how man behaves, and we can see that the Judeo-Christian moral law is far beyond the capabilities of his nature. What we need, then, is a modified, reasonable ethic, adjusted to man's true biological nature.

These people speak with concern of the conformists, who accept without question a meaningless moral structure and find themselves limited to a life devoid of real creativity and vitality. They see people clinging to tradition using it as a veil to hide from themselves the dark forces struggling

within them. They are protesting sincerely and compassionately in the name of these conformists, as well as for themselves. Perhaps we should look at the meaning of moral structure before we question its relevance.

The Meaning of Moral Structure Points to Faith

It might be helpful to review for a moment by way of a very elementary example why man needs a moral structure. During the war we heard many terrible stories revealing man's inhumanity to man, but one of the worst that I remember came out of a Nazi concentration camp. It reveals a biologic struggle for existence in terrible clarity. In this particular camp the food was served at erratic hours and the diabolical genius behind this torture further broke the prisoners by giving out half rations. Soon after the inmates were imprisoned there, what façade of civilization they possessed was torn away as hunger and fear drove them to destroy one another. In order to be fed each man had to lie awake waiting for the moment when the guards would come with the sparse amount of food. Then in a desperate fight over the scraps of garbage he would succeed or fail to secure it. In the midst of this struggle for existence a new moral structure appeared, based upon biologic need. The strong banded together to form a moral relationship of sorts. All save one would sleep, resting and conserving their strength while the one waited for the arrival of food. When the food came he would awaken his band and by force of strength they would drive away the others, the weak, to die.

These men were brought to the camp with the same moral structure that we have, but it seemed irrelevant to their biologic needs and they supplanted it with a new one. I might mention one other example more directly related to sex. Some time ago there was a story in the *Post-Dispatch* of a Russian woman's detention in Siberia. When a large group of prisoners whose sentences were completed came back in cattle cars, forty of the men who had not been near women for as long as fifteen years raped and killed a young girl member of the group. This is another dramatic example of the power of biological need. Perhaps these two examples are an unfair way to dramatize the significant and preserving power of law, but the claim of the enemies of the Judeo-Christian law is that when the chips are down civilization's veil is torn and moral law goes out the window. They are right when moral law is irrelevantly related to man's needs. They are wrong when it is based upon a relevant living faith.

Behind all moral law stands a faith. All law is a description of the way in which people who have this faith live together. St. Paul said that Abraham came before Moses. What he meant was that Abraham's relationship of faith in God came before Moses brought the law. Abraham and his descendents lived together in a contractual relationship with God. They believed they were his chosen people. They believed that it was their special responsibility to bear witness to Him. To preserve their community and their mission became the basic value upon which all relationships were

judged. As they were faithful to this central meeting, that of the one God, the Redeemer of Israel, we could describe their relationship as follows: They held this central meaning to be all important, i.e., one God and no others before Him. They did not murder one another. They did not covet each other's property. They did not commit adultery. They honored the Sabbath Day and their mothers and fathers. This is the way they kept their faith. We remember that Jesus said that laws are written in the heart if we have faith in and love for God and man. As faith and central meaning fade, people depend more and more on the *authority* of law to make people behave *as though* they had faith.

If one breaks a law or commandment, this in itself is not naughty or bad; what is much more important is that one has broken faith with the central meaning called God, which holds the community together. The whole community suffers. God is rejected as dead. This is why to break a commandment is to sin against God.

The Kinsey Report symbolizes the lost faith in the lost God. When the moral structure is questioned, broken, flaunted, the faith that binds people together and makes them one is gone. Kinsey emphasizes that the obvious characteristic of the women interviewed by his reporters was that they had no regrets about breaking the moral code. This would tell us that faith in the God of Christians and Jews is dead.

Men and women who have lost this faith must in honesty question the moral structure, for a moral structure binds them and asks them to sacrifice themselves for a common goal that transcends individual life. We must remember that sex has power. It does give pleasure and release. It is so powerful that we must respect the great vitality and life it involves. We cannot demand that a person's sexual feelings be suppressed without giving him something in return.

The Faith Which Makes Sense of Our Moral Structure and Our Lives

The love and trust which bind men into a community do not come naturally. Perhaps this is why it is said that "it comes from above." To go back to the Nazi concentration camp, I appreciate the fact that it is impossible for us really to understand the agony of this situation, but let us just suppose for a moment. If, instead of engaging in a destructive struggle for survival, these men had come together in a spirit of respect and love for one another, what a difference there would have been! If they had made their relationship to one another a measure of their faith in Christ they would have suffered greatly. The endurance of such suffering is not beyond possibility. There has been ancient history about the Jews in exile. There have been marvelous and bloody stories about Christian martyrs. In both cases the preservation of a love relationship determined the way they died. Poetry and legend are filled with implications of sacrifice and, as we read, we know that these people died having truly lived. If this situation had taken place in the concentration camp, the life of the men would have

been more peaceful, more courageous, more secure. I believe that the hunger in man's life for this sort of trust goes deeper than the biological need. We say that Christ, faith working through love, is man's deepest need. It is beyond power or pleasure. But it is a revealed need. There was One who died in faith that we might know this.

Natural, isolated man, before this faith comes into his life, meets other men as objects to be used to gain power or pleasure. It is as though each man meets others with a lasso in his hand to snare him to be used. Many have said that the dominating characteristic of our modern communities is that people never overcome isolation and live in superficial relationship. Even the closest family friends are met as though life were a cocktail party and people wish only to reveal certain guarded aspects of themselves. When man is alone and moves among other people in loneliness, he is anxious and frightened. He tends to grasp all to himself. This is what the Bible calls "lust." We who live in Christ can proclaim that people who live flittering personal relationships are not living at all, whether they are successful in their manipulation of others or not.

The Judeo-Christian man sees life and human meeting differently. To many it is an alien portrayal of life. It is as though in every encounter men are bound together. The whole encounter is "lassoed" or framed by the spirit of God. Each relationship is entered into in the faith that through this person, this "other," one can find new life. Martin Buber characterizes this as the address of the "I" to the "Thou." Always the other is thought of as the "Thou." Nothing is as holy or exalted as this encounter in love. But it involves pain. This is why we turn away. A marriage does not become real until the two unique individuals are struggling to accept their mutual uniqueness. We court and marry on the basis of our common interests and needs, but when time passes and we are forced to face our differences we tend to flee. This is why the Church frowns on divorce and why extra-marital relationhips are regarded as neurotic. Divorce and extra-marital sex represent flight from reality. Man matures when he faces "the other," whether it be wife, teacher, child, employee.

Judeo-Christian man extends this relationship of love to all things—to trees, to machinery, to animals and buildings. The Thou is always present in the other. This is why St. Francis could preach to the birds. This is why the psalmist could ask the "Seas and floods to bless the Lord, to praise Him and to magnify Him forever." He could see fields that clapped their hands and rivers that sang. It is no wonder the "the whole creation groaneth in travail," waiting for the kind of people that see life in this way. We who believe in the Christ are bound into a family relationship in which love and trust are our ultimate concern. Because of the gift of our Lord we seek to meet persons as persons and not to violate them as objects. To us all creation is Holy and we are at one with our God. Life for us has taken on such color and joy from this commitment that our need for power and pleasure stands transcended. If we wish a picture of this we look within us for we do have a law—we pray it is written on our hearts.

For the girl who asks for a relevant moral code that can be real for her we invite her into our family. In her life with us she can discover that her isolation has frightened her. She can find new life with us through the spirit of the man whom we commonly worship as our Lord. Through His strength we will find God. We know she desires this "new person." With us she need not be afraid, for the Spirit intercedes for us. With fear met and faith born, she can choose to live a way of life that asks her to reach far beyond herself, even to perfection. Perfection is by faith and not by moral law.

PEOPLE AND THINGS

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The principles of relationship laid down by Martin Buber in his book *I and Thou,* and further developed by Dr. Reuel Howe in his new book *Man's Need and God's Action,* raise questions that need to be answered by individuals in actual day by day experience. In both of these books, we learn that we live in a two-fold relationship—the relationship with things and the relationship with people. It is God's intention that we should use things and love people, and when we reverse the order, as we so often do, by loving things and using people, we are violating a very principle of the universe, and we become frustrated, lonely, and sad. What do we mean by this and how can we translate it into experience? How is this word made flesh?

I remember in one of the chapters of Jan Struthers' book *Mrs. Miniver,* entitled "A Pocket Full of Pebbles," she tells how during the day she gathered up little incidents, not from the big experiences of life, but the small, daily round of incidents; and how she shared them with her family at meal times. It is my intention to reach down into a "pocket full of pebbles" to share them, with the invitation that you consider your own examples and see if they become illumined for you in the light of this two-fold relationship to people and things.

Things. How important are they? People will object when they hear that content of curriculum, material necessities, and profits in business, for example, are of secondary importance, and they will stoutly defend the idea that they are of essential importance. I should like to suggest an approach that, in the curious paradox that often accompanies Christian thought, makes things both more and less important at the same time; the consideration of things as sacraments of relationship. Recently, we experienced a wedding, a funeral, and a church group in one week. In each of these experiences, things became of utmost importance because they were symbols of something that was deep and abiding, and not of importance in themselves.

The wedding was one of great beauty, and the feeling of the relationship of love and trust and hope was very apparent to all who attended—the re-

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lationship between the bride and groom, and among the members of the family known as an unusually strong and close family group. There was a very network of relationship apparent—with the parents of the bride, with the two sisters who were bridesmaids, reaching out to the friends. Because these relationships were so real, all of the material accompaniment of the wedding took on special significance. The flowers, the bridesmaids' dresses, the beauty of the church, and above all, the ring became sacraments of relationship. There are also occasions in which the consideration of things, as ends in themselves, results in the destruction of their real value.

The funeral was held for a woman who had, for all the years of her life, been known and loved for the gaiety and graciousness of her spirit. Her husband, a man of eighty-seven years, had been active all his life in business, and his chief contribution was in this field of relationships, which now included the fourth generation, the great grandsons of men he had known in the early years of lumbering. All of this seemed very real as friends gathered for the memorial service, and as the old man greeted his closest business associates, some of whom had come a great distance. There was again apparent this deep and almost overwhelming sense of belonging one to another. The music and flowers took on meaning beyond themselves as expressions of love and sympathy and friendship; these also may lose their importance through the very fact of giving them too much importance. Fortunately, our present day culture seems to be getting away from the ostentation and overemphasis of former funeral practices.

Perhaps there is no place where this is more directly applicable than to the church itself. The particular group in question was meeting for a two-weeks' conference, and during that time, the men were gathered together in an informal atmosphere without the benefit or handicap of clerical vestments. They became related to each other as people. One wishes that the laity could have a chance to see the ministers of the church in this simple, unadorned fashion more often. When one starts with a sense of the church being a fellowship of the concerned, and then works through to an appreciation of the sacraments and symbols, one gains a real appreciation for what they stand for; for taken from the other approach, the emphasis on ritual and symbols can become hollow, and even an idolatry in which the relationship with God and with man takes second place.

So much for examples of our relationship to things. How then shall we love people and become channels through which God can speak His love? Reuel Howe says that God speaks to man through man and communicates His infinite love through our finite love. We ask again, "How does this take place in our lives?" And we are told that a child first gets his idea of God from his father. This is appalling. We think of the story of two little boys who were discussing Christmas. One said, "Do you believe in Santa Claus?" And the other replied, "No. He is like the devil. He's your father." Now, it seems that in addition to being the devil and Santa Claus, father must also become God. We know that however inadequate

we may feel, this is a part of our task as parents. We know this to be true as we sit by the bedside of a child struggling to regain consciousness after surgery. As we pray for her to be sustained by the strength of God's presence, we know that we are at that moment the channel through which God may work. Much of the child's sense of trust can come through us and become part of her foundation of trust in God for the rest of her life. Or, take the case of a six-year-old who was to have a metabolism test. The doctor explained that he could almost never do a basal metabolism at this age and doubted if it would be successful but felt it necessary to try. The mother's start had to be with herself—to let go of any apprehension that might communicate itself to her child. Next, came a demonstration with a clothespin, letting the youngster put it on her nose and practice breathing into a funnel through her mouth so that she would know how it would feel. Then the mother sent her off to the hospital with a prayer in her heart. Forty minutes later, back came a relaxed, unconcerned child, and the test was complete. Who is to say whether it was the prayer, or the clothespin on her nose, or the wonderfully accepting nurse and doctor which did the trick? My belief is that it was all of them combined, most of all, the deep resources within the child herself, and that God was at work through all of them.

When we begin to sense such things, even vocabulary changes. Pride becomes gratitude, and this mother's prayer of thanks was not "I am so proud of my child," but "so thankful." Another change in vocabulary that seems indicated if we are to love people and use things is that we will not talk of *sending* our children to camp or to school as if they were parcel post bundles. Instead, recognizing each individual as a perfectly unique child of God—no other like him in all the world since time began, we will be conscious of trying to work out decisions *with* him that will work toward the greatest possible fulfillment of his own very special self.

When we look on life this way, there can be a radiance to even the smallest, most insignificant event. Two rosy-cheeked four-year-olds come up from the garden early in May clutching in their grimy, little hands huge bunches of daffodils, all broken off at the very heads. There is an immediate reaction of anger—"Those naughty children—my favorite flowers," but before the thought breaks out into words, another thought comes to the rescue—"Love people, use things." Flowers *are* important, but children are more so, and besides, they are being presented as an offering of love to you. Dare you reject this gift? And so you take them with thanks and arrange them in water; and only after this, do you explain how much you enjoy seeing flowers in their natural growing places, and that next time you would like, please, to be asked before the tulips suffer the same sad fate.

Apparently, it is in the accumulation of experiences that a child develops meaning for his life and grows into an attitude of trust in God because he has had experiences with trusting people which prevailed over his experiences of the untrustworthiness of people. For let us not deceive ourselves,

we all receive both, and we all supply both, but each experience of trust makes us stronger to bear the experience of mistrust. Don't we see it happening all the time? Who will forget the doctor who came ninety miles from a medical meeting at 1:00 in the morning to see one's sick child, and not feel that he senses God's love working through the doctor's love? Another doctor, I remember, came to see our baby who was extremely ill. He did all he could for him at the hospital and because I was all alone, he said, "Come on. I've called my wife. You're going home with me." Indeed, that evening the cocktails and the dinner became sacraments of relationship, and their friendship and love communicated God's love in a very real sense. Have you noticed how often food does become a means of relationship, especially to growing boys? A chocolate cake can say more than any word. When we remember that God chose a mortal man to communicate the greatest gift of all, His love, and that in the sacrament of Communion, Jesus used the common food of his day, we get a glimpse of the way God wants us to use this two-fold relationship to people and things; then, even the smallest thing becomes related and significant—the bow on a child's hair, the candles on a birthday cake—all assume an importance far beyond their intrinsic value. Remembering this, we can take the bacon and eggs and the peanut butter sandwiches of every day, and, giving thanks, offer them to Him, for use in our relationships with His children—and ours.

But what happens when you cannot love a child, either because he is being so unlovable, or because in a situation your love cannot follow him as far as he seems to need it? To take the second question first, we will have to realize that God is working and speaking to our children through other lives than our own, and sometimes all we can do is to surrender that youngster to God's action through others. ("Every partial relationship leads to the Eternal," says Martin Buber in *I and Thou.*) As an illustration of this, an older friend tells of an incident which she remembers after more than fifty years. As a small child, she was required by her grandfather to learn a Bible verse each week. One week the verse was, *"When thy mother and father forsake thee, the Lord will take thee up."* She says that this terrified her, and the Lord seemed very obscure and far away until one afternoon she climbed up into the lap of her favorite uncle and pleaded, "When my father and mother forsake me, will *you* take me up?" And after he promised that he would, she was never quite so afraid again. Or take the case of a small boy starting kindergarten for the first time. For a month prior to the opening day, he was extremely anxious and worried about this new adventure that lay before him. His family did all that they could dream up to help allay his fears. A trip was made to the school where he slid on the slides, viewed the blackboards, drank out of every bubble fountain, and even found the location of the toilets. This all helped, but at the end of the tour, he pin-pointed his fears by saying, "I am not shy of any of those things. They don't have faces, and teachers do. Where is my teacher?" On the opening day, accompanied by his mother, he did find the teacher, and fortunately, she had a smiling face, but the next morning

presented the real challenge of going out and hopping on a bus and starting out from home on his own. As the big yellow bus approached, and the doors swung open, there was a moment of panic in which it seemed he could not go, and then, he looked up into the face of the bus driver and said, "Good Morning. What is your name?" When the bus driver answered, "Bob," which was also the child's name, the hurdle was cleared, and then a small girl called out, "Come on, Bobby, and sit beside me." His mother felt that these two were indeed angels of the Lord and she could surrender her child to them and to all those others who would be helping him build meanings for his life. In some way, I believe this lies at the heart of intercessory prayer.

But how can we love and accept our child when he is most unlovable, for as Dr. Howe points out, this is when he is in the greatest need of love. Well, first of all, we must face the fact that we cannot, at least to the degree that he needs it; and yet, to the extent that we are able to love the unlovable, we are required to do so. How else can we understand that God's love is a gift freely given, not needing to be earned or justified by being worthy, and a child needs—we all need desperately—to know that he can make mistakes and still be loved. And so with God's love—we do not need to earn it by being good. Indeed, how could we? All we have to do is to accept it. And how else can we accept it other than by accepting each other to the extent that we are able? This cannot be done by word alone. A child came home from school with a little note laboriously written out in her childish writing, "I need a smock. I need a blanket. I need name tapes." Absently, the mother laid the note aside and went off to a Sunday School meeting where the theme was largely on the need to accept the children coming into our Church Schools—a thrilling meeting. Still in a glow the next morning, the mother was rudely reminded by her small, angry child that she had done nothing to meet this youngster's needs. As she came downstairs with the blanket and smock in her arms, they did indeed seem like sacraments—tangible symbols of acceptance.

Another story has a special meaning for me because it is a true one in the life of our family. One Christmas season a few days before *the day,* a prayer group gathered at our home for one of the most beautiful mornings any of us can ever remember. The talk given by our oldest and wisest and most discerning member was a thrilling one. The meditations seemed especially meaningful, and toward the end a friend with an exquisite voice sang for us. The music was so beautiful that we made a tape recording of her singing "Oh, Holy Night," and as she left, I thanked her, saying, "This is all I could ask of Christmas, and I will be able to preserve your beautiful gift in that recording." That afternoon, as I came in from some errands, I called the family to me and said, "There is a real treat I want to share with you," and prepared to play the recording. As we turned it on, there was a garble of sound—chopsticks, laughter, shouts and screams, and hidden away in the background, just the remnants of this beautiful Christmas song. Our daughter and some friends had been playing with

the tape recorder, and through misunderstanding, instead of continuing on, had recorded over the earlier portion, thereby destroying our record. It was a moment of indescribable horror, and I do not believe I ever felt so angry and sad, all at the same time. I simply threw myself into my husband's arms and wept; and then, after a while, in a pause, I heard the sound of sobbing in the other room, and realized it was my child. As I went in to her, she raised her head and said, "Mummy don't give me anything for Christmas this year. I don't deserve it after what I have done." And this was enough to restore me to my senses too. As I gathered her in my arms, I said, "I guess I wouldn't know anything about Christmas if there weren't the meaning of forgiveness." So then, we both wept, but this time it was not bitter because we were together. I share this story with you as an example of our two-fold relationship with things and with people in the hopes that it will call to mind events in your own experience that may become illumined in the way that this story was formed, and that as we go through our lives in the daily rounds of seemingly unimportant details, we may gain a surer sense of God's presence everywhere, in all, through all, and over all, that will give meaning to all of life.

PORTRAIT OF THE BIGOT

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The bigot is a man of paradox; though exhibiting strength, tenacity and zeal in his belief, he is none the less a terribly frightened person. The basic element of his insecurity is often missed when he is portrayed, although Feuchtwanger and Maas, in their various writings, have probed his nature with keen discernment. The reason we often fail to see his weakness is because he is so overwhelming in his passion that we lesser men have a sense of guilt in not maintaining our convictions as firmly as he does. We have a silent admiration for his persistency and insistency. While we may fear him, there is a longing to be as certain as he is.

The thesis, however, of this article is that our secret esteem is basically wrong, because we do not recognize the elements of danger and sickness in his make-up. His convictions are not really principles of belief arrived at through philosophical or scientific evaluation; they are disguises whereon he props his very being. His nature is essentially the same, whether he be Catholic, Protestant, or Jew; Communist or Fascist. Within the framework of his unique individual self is a pattern of pathological reaction which he shares with all of his ilk. It is this which we shall attempt to delineate.

Where Force Indicates Weakness

It is almost axiomatic among pschologists that an overdomination of emotional force indicates a deeper problem of personality. The person who is acting always in the extreme, regardless of the theories he propounds, is attempting to handle a disturbance within. There are times when every one of us acts in an extreme manner, even psychotically; but the bigot is differentiated by the fact that, for him, there is no relaxation, no re-evaluation, only a driving compulsive force which demands that he be right. Bigotry, then, is not manufactured artifically but is an integral characteristic of the bigot's personality. In this sense, he is a victim, although his whole purpose is to master.

The statement has been attributed to Santayana that a fanatic is one who redoubles his courage when he feels his cause to be lost. Loss, for the bigot, has an even sharper meaning than bereavement for the average mourner.

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In both, there is a sense of panic when loss occurs, but the average mourner will in time accept his lot, whereas the bigot is always fearful of losing and dare not anticipate a change in circumstances. His very tenacity must indicate that he is fearful of losing something. His fanaticism, therefore, assumes a form of therapeutic magic whereby loss is averted and he is safe from external harm.

In such individuals, the psychodynamics of ambivalence play an important role. It may be said that bigotry and fanaticism are actually attempts to disguise the intense feeling of ambivalence; for, in revealing to the outside world a singleness of purpose, a consistency of belief, the bigot can very well hide the other aspect of himself which he must deny. The conflict within is actually a vicious circle; the doubt generates denial; denial leads to defense; defense to demonstration by dictating to others; and resistance to dictation renews the doubt and sets the circle again in motion. Dr. Rudolph Lowenstein in his book, *Christians and Jews, a Psychoanalytic Study,* has said: "the measure of a believer's hatred of an unbeliever . . . is the measure of his own unconscious struggle to repress ambivalent feelings toward his God."

Looking at this statement from the psychoanalytic point of view, it means that the unconscious ambivalent feelings of love and hate for the father-parent figure are projected onto the universe itself. The feeling developed in relationship to the father became the measurement of attitude toward all men and more especially toward all forms of authority. The bigot has a problem with authority. In his childhood, the father represents authority. Conscience becomes so intense because of his hateful feelings toward his father that he escapes this dilemma by becoming an authoritative, or authoritarian personality himself. His simulated devotion to father, or God, is his manner of revealing obedience and intense conformity, whereby he can escape punishment for the imposing, fearful, hostile thoughts and wishes. To be even more devout than father will not only gain his father's approval, but will keep from father the fact that he is actually antagonistic and hateful. He is the "good son" who can amaze father by the sincerity of his devotion—and *thereby conquer father himself.* The very fact that he must "outdo" father is an indication of his hostile competitive feelings. It is these feelings which the bigot strives so mightily to hide.

Monotheism and Bigotry

For religionists there is more than a superficial challenge in the following observation made by Dr. Lowenstein: "Religious anti-Semitism is an expression of the intolerance inherent in monotheistic religions . . . the explanation of such cruelty is to be found in the ambivalence of all human emotions and especially in those of a child toward his father and—by extension—those of a believer toward his God. Anyone who does not share his faith is an object of hatred, Monotheists are all the more intolerant of unbelievers because their one and only God will not tolerate any ambivalence

in their feelings toward him. He demands absolute submission and unquestioning devotion to the ethical principles established in his name." A similar observation was made by Toynbee, who recognized the dangers of exclusivism within the monotheistic formulations of religion.

We cannot here enter into an apologia for monotheism, except to point out that Dr. Lowenstein would be wrong if he assumed this the case for all monotheists, and since, by his own interpretation, fanaticism is a pathological projection, *the fundamental question is not the religious belief* per se *but the emotional psychic equipment the believer brings to his religion.* By way of contrast, ambivalence cannot totally explain a Schweitzer or a Baeck. The writer of the book of Ruth was a monotheist, who disagreed with Ezra and Nehemiah. The fact that some choose the elements of love within their religion and others choose authority and hostility (although the two are not to be equated) must cause us to make some further differentiations about the nature of monotheism. A mature conception of God, montheistically conceived, need not be intolerant; it would be a contradiction even in psychologic terms. However, Dr. Lowenstein's remark should serve as a warning to the orthodox and the liberal, for neither is immune from intolerance. (The Reconstructionist concept of God as Process is one way of theologically dealing with the inherent problems of intolerance within monotheistic expressions.) Yet the price of every conviction must carry the taint of possible intolerance within it; it is only when men refuse to see their own errors that monotheism, or any other philosophy, becomes a way of divisiveness and intolerance. Absolutism and security seldom walk hand in hand.

If we are permitted to theorize that the saint is one who has transformed and canalized his feelings of hostility into loving relationship, the bigot, in contradistinction, utilizes religion—or any doctrine—to expend, without release, his inner anger and antagonisms. Both have in common an extremism of action and attitude; but where the one would heal, the other would hurt. The saint affirms; the bigot denies. The saint exalts; the bigot throttles. The saint accepts; the bigot disdains.

Freud pointed out, for example, that the more recent and unwilling converts to Christianity were always intensely anti-Semitic, an observation made by many Jewish laymen without recognizing the dynamics involved. These Jewish anti-Semites (and they need not always convert) suffer likewise from ambivalent feelings. They know they have denied the religion of their fathers, and whether they have done so forcibly or voluntarily, they cannot escape feelings of guilt, Here, too, lies the dread of punishment for the act of betrayal, which can come from beyond the grave. The denial of the father and father-religion must be overcome in forceful overt manner to resolve all doubts. And who would better serve as proof of his good intentions than the group from which they sprang? For in destroying their former brethren, they not only give assurance of loyalty to their new faith, but also rationalize away the act of betrayal and denial by presuming them-

selves to be now superior. The Jew remains for these, as he is for all anti-Semites, a reminder of that which they would throw off; he is the disturber of their conscience—and what disturbs our conscience, we hate. Is it not likely that some of the violent anti-Communists, who have undergone some form of conversion, are repeating the pattern described here? Seemingly the change of religion does not mean a change of heart.

It is not strange that both Communism and Fascism organize feelings of violence into messianic doctrines. The members of the Klan, the Bund, and the Cell are characterized by brutality and conspiracy; and both are forms of violence against society. The dynamic of rebellion will always appeal to those who have not been able to handle their feelings of hostility against the parent-authority figure. Fascism utilized anti-Semitism to destroy Christianity; and Communism called religion an opiate. In each situation the focus of attack was against the authority figure in society.

In the case of the religious bigot we deal with a pattern which is somewhat dissimilar from the revolutionist, since he, the fanatic, is the conformist *par excellence*. No word association will ever bring the bigot into the purview of the rebellious one: he is characterized by everything of the opposite nature. However, the intrinsic quality of the bigot is that he is also a rebellious person; he is actually a blasphemer. The secondary response of obedience, zealous adherence, is in exact proportion to his ambivalent sense of exception, rebellion and desire to blaspheme. His inquisition is against the "heretics" for these are the unconscious reminders of himself. Since blasphemy must mean terrible punishment by an avenging God, punishment is meted out to others as his denial of having felt or held such evil thoughts, and thus places him on the side of the avenging angel with whom he now qualifies.

Fenichel writes, "there is hardly a single compulsion neurosis without religious features; for example, obsessive conflicts between faith and impulses to blaspheme, which may occur in convinced atheists as well as in conciously pious persons" (*The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*). In the bigot these divisive feelings are pronounced. For how else could we explain his demanding, tyrannizing attitude? Wherefore his insistence that he is right? Why does he burn books and people at the stake? Why does he strive so hard to prove that he is pious and righteous? Neither facts nor reason will ever change his mind. Does not this very rigidity indicate his fear?

How to Deal with the Demagogue

It might be fruitless to differentiate between the demagogue and the fanatic. The latter is driven and the former drives; both, however, are held fast within the irrational forces within themselves. Whatever differences there are, it may be said that the demagogue is consciously, ruthlessly exploiting the fears of people, because of his primary identification with them on the level of the irrational in which he revels, whereas the fanatic

may withdraw into a shell about himself until he finds himself threatened. The demagogue is always finding a way to lash out; the fanatic must be frightened before he will attack. Some of our politicians know the difference between the two manifestations—they are brothers under the conscious level, and the demagogue always knows he can count on the energy of the fanatic to help him win his cause. The difference, at best, is one of individual psychology; the psychic boundary lines cannot be delimited.

In the face of the bigot, how do we stand? Arguments, facts will not change or dissuade him from his psychic or social course. Counter-propaganda will not cause him to review his position. To appease him is folly; to explain is fruitless. The liberal and the mature have recourse to only one form of action: to stand fast, without borrowing his methods. To waiver, to cringe is his delight. Like the bully, the bigot then senses his power. In the face of dignified silence, when confronting mature upholding of principle, he retreats in blustering confusion. Attack upon attack has been made upon the president of one of our best-known colleges by super-patriots and professional anti-Communists. Throughout months of threat, feverish displays of emotion, he has held fast to the principles of academic freedom and he has interpreted them as honestly and patriotically as possible. Bands of howling troglodytes have not been able to shake him from his position. Supported by a group of unfrightened mature people, he has held fast and has won the admiration of the nation. The bigots keep pecking away, but they know they have met a single formidable opponent whose courage has caused them confusion, and whose steadfastness has revealed their cowardice. He exemplifies that which all men in a democracy must learn: that convictions do not mean inquisitions; that principles are not prejudices; that "bigness" in faith is above the pettiness of bigotry.

PASTORAL OBSERVATIONS OF HOSPITALIZED SENILE PATIENTS

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Pastoral work with the aged has been a subject of increasing concern during the past few years. The following is an account of one worker's observations and efforts as a chaplain on a ward of senile male patients in a state hospital.

Interest in these people was first stimulated by the chaplain's doubts as to the helpfulness of the hospital "push" program. What was the value of making these old men run around in circles, clap their hands like children, and play active children's games? Was it not apparent that such activities are resented by many patients? Further, was it possible that the program was more related to the needs of workers at a loss about activities for seniles than it was of therapeutic value to the patients themselves?

Opportunities to observe people on the ward came in three ways: a weekly worship service on the ward; a "coffee and chat" group, which included several ward members; and a number of observation periods, during which the writer recorded patterns of behavior and reactions to various stimuli on the ward.

Ward I is home to about forty old men, most of them past seventy. Most of these are diagnosed in one or another of the various types of emotional disorders associated with senility. In addition, there are several younger patients with severe organic impairment. The ward is serviced by four attendants.

The immediate impression one gets is of a general lack of activity. For the most part, the men sit by themselves, each apparently absorbed in his own thoughts. The observation notes are full of illustrations of this, including examples of a tendency to show great annoyance at anyone who interrupts the isolation. For so unobjectionable a deed as sitting down next to J.V., J.L. received a punch in the eye. Certain patients make a practice of taking a swing at anyone who comes too close. Anything new in the routine is likewise regarded with annoyance. There is great insistence on the part of patients that they sit in the same chair each day. Further, some men will sit only in chairs of a certain color. On several occasions, men were observed being rudely shoved and hit for chancing to sit where another had staked a claim.

Equally noticeable is the presence of a group of "characters" among the patients, men who hold the stage and receive most attention from personnel. Ward life seems more or less to revolve about them. E.S. is by far the most outstanding figure. He is a good-looking, white-haired old man, cantankerous, but amusing, and it is he who commands the attention of attendants, nurse trainees, and others. Several other men compete with him for this distinction, while a large group of men seem to receive little besides care for their bodily needs.

Lack of control in sexual and aggressive areas is very apparent. One is partly reminded of the "jungle ethics" of the nursery. But in children, the controls, the fruitful investments in outer reality, have yet to be made. Senility would seem to be a losing struggle to maintain controls that have been more or less effective in adult life. These men are not children, and one can observe in many the struggle to retain adult modes of living. There is some ability to discriminate between potential friends and enemies, and, occasionally, some display of interest and concern for another's well-being. L.M., for example, will help one feebler than himself to make his way to a chair; R.H., who is allowed to go outside occasionally, sometimes brings flowers or stones to a friend.

But these examples stand out only because of their rarity. One is reminded of Grotjahn's statement that it is the narcissistic person who reacts to senility with a psychosis—the person who throughout his life has remained at a relatively harmful level of self-centeredness.[1] The case records would seem to bear out this observation. E.S., for example, formerly pictured as a very selfish man, overly concerned with clothes, willing to buy himself a new car at the expense of other members of the family, presents himself in old age as a demanding, pitiable old man, constantly accusing everyone of stealing his clothes and taking his possessions from him. Here is a man whose illness appears to grow naturally from his pre-psychotic character pattern.

Latent neurotic patterns seem to break forth when the controls have gone. Self-punitive behavior, in particular, is evident, as J.R. and B.N. spend their days slapping and punching themselves, to the point of raising painful welts and calluses. It is admittedly hard to determine how much of this is a response to circulatory failure and how much is neurotic, but one is struck by the content of some of their mutterings: "No, no, no!," "Yes mama, no mama," "I won't do it again."

Possessiveness and extreme concern for material objects is common. Wooden pencils, old magazines, sticks, anything that can be kept from the watchful eyes of attendants, are greatly treasured. J.V. takes pains to make sure that people notice his pencils and magazines, which he shows proudly; at the same time, he reveals deep hurt at receiving few visits from his family.

[1] Grotjahn, Martin, "The Emotional Problems of Elderly People," *Geriatrics*, 3: 135, 1948.

Having been cut loose from the prime objects of emotional investment, it is as though security-value is attached to objects and things which are treasured and safe-guarded at all costs.

In view of the commonplace that old people are greatly concerned about dying and the after-life, it may be well to record that this concern, if present, rarely appeared verbally during the six months of my work as chaplain with these men. On the one hand, there was the impression that this concern simply does not bother many of these men. They seem far more concerned about loss of immediate possessions, about the family that doesn't visit, about the coat that has been stolen. J.V., for example, remarked on one occasion that, though he had attended Mass every Sunday till coming to the hospital, he could see no connection between his religion and the fact that "we all gotta go sometime; none of us knows what comes then."

On the other hand, the psychiatric rationale of senility may indicate something else. Senility is generally interpreted as physical involution of the organism—and various psychological adaptive responses to it. The symptoms of senility are mostly by way of adapting to external changes and the stress of inner upheavals. The withdrawal, the cantankerousness, the narcissistic concern with the body, the general ego-retreat to an earlier level of adjustment would all seem to be a way of denying that one is growing old. One flaunts his sexuality in the face of its gradual weakening, asserts his importance (E.S. claims to be in all the history books, says he has done everything better than anyone else in history) in the face of desertion by family and contemporaries, adopts a hard-shelled attitude so that others cannot get close enough to hurt.

What is suggested here is that the lack of manifest concern with death and the after life may be a part of the general inability of these people to face up to the fact of growing old. Growing old is painful, physically and psychically, and is to be denied at all costs.

Strangely enough, hospital personnel often seem willingly drawn in on the conspiracy. It may be easier to deal with these people as though they were little children. Whatever the reason, activities seem to bounce from the extreme of children's games to the other of expecting the men to produce as mature adults. They are treated like babes, and at the same time expected to fulfill adult demands without receiving adult satisfactions and gratifications.

Patients are not unaware of this. Those men on the ward who are in best "contact" indicated, after a time, some resentment at the attitudes of personnel. The following is but one example of several similar conversations.

J.V.: I'm not a baby, and I get tired of being treated like one.
Chaplain: They seem to treat you as if you were a baby?
J.V.: That's it. Who wants to play those damn games, anyway?
Chaplain: What kind of things would you like to do while you're here?

J.V.: Oh, sit around and talk—about farming and things we used to do. I get a kick out of that.

This patient had sensed that activities for senile patients might be geared to letting them be what they are—old people. Instead of entering into the conspiracy of regression, would it not be possible to provide chances for doing things old men generally like to do: crackerbarrel sessions, simple crafts, coffee drinking, and the like?

A "coffee and chat" group was formed, in the hope that an atmosphere of acceptance, of willingness to let these men be what they are without unreasonable demands, might encourage the formation of realistic and manageable relationships. Group members were J.V., R.H., and G.S. from Ward I, and F.Q. and T.R., two older men from other wards. Each of the men was approached, and interest in such a group determined. A brief outline of several typical sessions follows:

January 4: The group met in a dormitory on Ward I, after several of the men helped the chaplain bring in the chairs. Our purpose in meeting was discussed, "to get together and talk about things we're interested in, and to enjoy some coffee together." T.R. and F.Q. talked readily, and the conversation centered around farming, the weather, animals, and past dust storms in the state. J.V. and R.H. sat quietly, rather self-absorbed, until the coffee was served. Somehow, this seemed to act as an "ice-breaker," and the group talked more freely. The meeting lasted about an hour, and we decided to meet again.

January 11: All members present. Conversation picked up where it had ended in the previous session, and once again we talked about modern farming and "the way we used to do it." J.V. talked somewhat, but R.H. seemed preoccupied, and several times left the group to gaze out of the dormitory windows. The group noticed this, but nothing was said. Finally, when the coffee was served, R.H. returned, and thereafter entered somewhat into the conversation. Some feelings about ward personnel were expressed.

January 16: In this session, "farm talk" seemed to run dry, and F.Q. and J.V. openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the hospital. We talked about this, and several men expressed feelings of loneliness, how they missed the farm and the folks at home. J.V. became rather anxious about this, and T.R. tried to "buck him up." For the first time, there seemed to be growing awareness of group members of one another.

As the sessions continued, the men seemed more secure with each other. Sometimes J.V. and R.H. would lapse into periods of silence, and G.S. was generally uncommunicative, but generally everyone contributed something to the discussions. There was no pushing to "join in," but at the same time, everyone had a chance to talk if he wanted to.

After about seven meetings, it was noticed by the attendants that J.V. and R.H. were forming a friendship on the ward. These two men, who

had been sitting across from each other on the ward for months, unaware of each other, soon began to sit together, chatting about things in general, and apparently enjoying each other's company. R.H., who can walk well enough to go outside daily, began to bring feathers, pretty stones and leaves to his less fortunate friend. Both of these men seem to have been somewhat helped by their friendship, being more "alive" generally since it began. In this instance, one of the goals of the group was achieved. The other members, for the ten weeks of group meetings, seemed at least to enjoy the chance to talk with interested people and to express some of their feelings about hospitalization.

It might be objected that this activity lies outside the sphere of the chaplain. What about the more formal religious activities? Simple worship services were held weekly for five months, consisting of familiar hymns, Bible readings, and occasional slides on such themes as "The Good Shepherd." The general tone of the services was one of comfort and consolation. Certain patients seem to have found these services of value, particularly where the services allowed them to move closer to some of their feelings of loneliness and share them with the chaplain. Participation in these services increased only to a point, and the effects on those who find it hard to communicate will never be known. It seems interesting, in any event, that hymns seem to be remembered long after interest and comprehension of the Bible have passed. The hymns and the person of the minister seem to serve, in some, as a link with a part of the past which has been not too threatening.

But these men generally were not "religious" people, judged in terms of past church attendance and expressed interest. Ministry to them can best be understood in terms of interpersonal relations. The chaplain can be a source of accepting love, one who will listen and allow expression of feelings without exhibiting either anger or, what may be worse, condescension and amusement. He may provide opportunities, through group leadership, to relate in ways still possible; to ruminate about the past—and yet to make toward others in the present whatever outreaches are still possible.

Realistic recognition that there are definite limits in this area of pastoral work, that much of the aging process and its derivatives are of an irreversible nature, would seem important in helping the pastor avoid undue discouragement with infrequent external results. Yet, within limits, there is an opportunity and a need for ministry. Perhaps even more important than the implications for work with old people in hospitals are the indications that the church has an important part in helping people to grow old "gracefully," to maintain meaningful object-investments and life satisfactions in terms of the fellowship of believers.

THE MENTAL HOSPITAL CHAPLAIN: A PROTESTANT INTERPRETATION

THE REV. MILES RENEAR

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The Protestant minister traces his vocation back to the commission which Jesus gave to his twelve disciples: "Preach as you go, saying, 'The kingdom of heaven is at hand.' Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons." (Matthew 10:7-8—Revised Standard Version)

In this commission, the proclaiming of the nearness of heaven, while it is primary, is only a fifth part of the minister's functions. Historically, the minister's task is to heal those who are sick, to revive those who are dead, to give absolution and reconciliation to those whom society has ostracized as unclean, and to exorcise all that is foreign, parasitical, and destructive to the individual's true personality.

In the early days of Christianity, when physicians were rapidly losing what might have been called anything like a scientific approach to the treatment of illness, the healers of the Church often did their patients less harm and more good than did those who applied various remedies which had little justification either from the point of view of bio-chemistry or that of psychotherapy.

By the Middle Ages, the sacramental ministry of the Western Church had come into full bloom. As this is substantially the type of ministry offered by the Catholic chaplain of the present day, I will move quickly into the post-Reformation period.

As large portions of Protestantism became less and less sacramental, they became more and more "word-centered"—the Word of the Scripture and the Word as interpreted by the sermon. The minister was less and less called a "pastor" or shepherd, and more and more he became known seven days a week as a "preacher."

In the latter part of the nineteenth century there were at least two reactions to this limited concept of the function of the minister. One was Christian Science, whose practitioners boldly began to compete openly with physicians in the treating of the sick.

The other reaction was the growth of concern for the so-called "social gospel." Many ministers, though by no means the majority, began to believe that their professional concern must be for the whole man, for his

bodily and mental health, for his economic welfare, and for his interpersonal relationships on all levels. In the first flush of enthusiasm, some ministers felt they could and indeed ought to be either trained or amateur social workers, pro-labor economists, and poor men's psychiatrists. Some even sought to restore to respectability the practice of unction and the laying-on of hands as a supplement to the ministrations of the physician and the surgeon. As in many younger professions, the Protestant ministry (at least the better trained men in it) was going through a period of soul-searching and re-evaluation of themselves and their function in society.

Out of all this historical background has come a working philosophy of the parish minister and the institutional chaplain which is perhaps rejected by many Protestant clergy, partially accepted by an ever-growing number, but believed in and practiced by a few. It is out of these few—men who have added clinical training to their academic studies and their unsupervised experience, and many of whom have been or are in therapy themselves—that most of our Protestant chaplains are being selected for mental hospitals today.

Even as there are a number of schools of thought within even such a specialized discipline as psychoanalysis, so are there differing points of view among these chaplains. There are theological and liturgical differences among them, and each has his own leanings in the field of psychological theory and therapeutic procedure. But there is a core of unity in their thinking and practice in regard to the chaplain's function. We think of ourselves as therapists—with as small a "t" as you wish, but nonetheless therapists.

Our training has led us to be sensitive to the patient-parishioner as a person, not as a blank slate on which we can write the formula of salvation, nor as an empty jug into which we can pour the proper amount of grace from our bottles of sermons, doctrines, and moral prescriptions.

This person whom we seek to relate to in a therapeutic and redemptive way does need to know and feel that heaven, with its infinite acceptance and promise of rebirth, is at hand. But this good news frequently finds the person insulated by a wall of emotional scab and scar tissue. He cannot swallow a spiritual capsule, and when we try to give him a religious hypodermic, we cannot find a vein.

And so the awareness of the presence of a loving, healing God must sometimes be allowed to seep in gradually by a sort of interpersonal osmosis. In this process the chaplain is a symbolic person. The degree of acceptance and withholding of judgment that he is capable of conveying to the patient may equal the extent to which the patient is able to believe again that God or anybody else loves him and can forgive him and will not seek to harm him.

The chaplain will of course find some occasions, such as in his sermons, in which he will try to make the promises of Scripture real to his patients

by openly facing with them their emotional struggles and pointing out how the people of the Bible, including Jesus, have struggled with these same destructive forces within themselves, and by describing the means by which these people laid hold of God's help and won their battles for total health.

But this verbal reassurance and clarification is a relatively small part of the chaplain's function. He fulfills his commission to "heal the sick" by being a part of the healing team. At all times he seeks to represent, in what he says and in the way in which he relates to people, the Church's commitment to the side of life and health. For at all times (whether his denomination actually uses the term or not) the minister is a priest, seeking to help his parishioners remove whatever may be injuring the life-giving and health-giving relationship which is meant to exist between man and God. The Protestant chaplain spends a good deal of his time hearing confessions. For the most part these are informal, incomplete, and unsacramental, but they are nonetheless confessions. There are many techniques, and there is much variety in their application, but there is definitely a priestly function of the minister both with groups and with individuals which is designed to help bring total health to the total person.

The minister is commissioned to "raise the dead." We all know that every mental hospital is well-stocked with living corpses—seniles, catatonics, degenerated schizophrenics. By his tradition the chaplain is committed to an optimism about even these people which borders on the unrealistic. The chaplain cannot write these people off his list of parishioners. Together with all the other therapists he must seek to reach through and touch whatever spark is still alive within these living dead.

The chaplain is commissioned to "cleanse lepers." The ministry of reconciliation has many tools, and verbal assurance of God's forgiveness is perhaps the least useful of these. Most Protestant traditions have abandoned sacramental confession and absolution, but the task of reconciliation still belongs to the minister. Here again he is often most effective when he demonstrates by attitude even more than by words that he does not condemn the person who—rightfully or wrongfully—feels guilty, but rather that he *accepts* the person. This says, more eloquently than words, that if the so-called "man of God" can accept the sinner, how much more does God accept, forgive, and restore him.

And lastly, the chaplain is commissioned to "cast out demons." It is a rare thing for a chaplain to consider this in terms of the psychoshock of exorcism, though he might be willing to do this at the request of a psychiatrist. But our mentally ill patients are indeed possessed by many demons, ranging from tyrannical super-egos to the complex torments that beset a paranoid schizophrenic.

Even as psychiatry has no one technique to eliminate demons, but may use electroshock, group therapy, brief analysis, and occupational diversions, so the chaplain has no one technique. But he does believe that "perfect love

casts out fear, for fear has to do with punishment" (I John 4:18—Revised Standard Version). The sick person is a battleground for what Karl Menninger has called "love against hate." The chaplain directs his efforts so that love may drive out and coax out the destructive emotions that torment the patient.

The chaplain's immediate goals for the patient are not greatly different from those of the psychiatrist or any other member of the healing team. But by virtue of his tradition and his calling the chaplain explicitly seeks to assist the patient in his relating to Ultimate Reality. For in that relationship the chaplain sees the source and wellspring of life and health.

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EDITORIALS

Summer Laboratories for Group Dynamics

Most of us can recall the amusing experience encountered at a carnival or some amusement resort, when we are confronted by full-length mirrors that produced extraordinary, distorted images. Perhaps in one we appeared as a compressed midget, in another we resembled the world's tallest man, while in a third we looked like a human washboard. In such situations we are startled, amused but not really disturbed because we know that the images are not real, the pictures we see aren't true, the persons we are looking at really don't exist.

An entirely different situation exists when we enter a clothing store and are confronted with a full-length mirror that *doesn't* distort. This can and frequently does disturb us. What we see this time is what other people see of us. Very often the image which we encounter in the non-distorting mirror is not the same image we have in our minds about ourselves. In fact, one of the first things we usually do is to attempt to correct what we see. It may be simply buttoning our coat, straightening up, smoothing our hair, or even assuming a different position. Sometimes we just hurry out.

Let us now expand this experience into a multiple situation. Let us suppose we find ourselves in the center of a room which is completely *lined* with mirrors! Around this room is a gallery filled with people watching us. We quite naturally now feel even more threatened, less secure, more vulnerable, uncomfortable, defensive, hostile.

It is into such a situation that one voluntarily places himself when he enrolls in one of the several training programs in group dynamics such as the one which the National Training Laboratory for Group Development held in Bethel, Maine. While there are often some clergymen and other religious workers enrolled, they actually represent but a small fragment of the total student body. The latter is usually made up of educators, social

workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, executives of foundations, Army and Navy and Air Force personnel, representatives of state and federal agencies, and many from industry including public relations officers, personnel men, training supervisors and executives. They represent many religious affiliations—and in some cases none. There frequently are foreign countries represented.

Classes are small, usually made up of about fifteen people. The sessions are divided into training periods and practice periods. The former are unstructured, permissive, and intense. Within an incredibly short time a relatively free and natural relationship usually evolves. First names (often bestowed by the Church but seldom used within the Church) are invariably employed in all communication, whether one is a student or a member of the staff. Again and again one may find himself saying this is the way God intends us to live—honestly, actively, and in real and close relationship with one another. Each individual is valued for himself. Rank and status on the outside are largely ignored. Often they proved to be handicaps in the process of being accepted by the group.

The Kingdom, however, is not coming any sooner in these training laboratories than in the Church. There is often a pathos, a tragic unreality —as well as warmth and nourishment—in the fraternization which takes place especially outside of classes and in the evenings. Relationships are enjoyed, which often cannot be continued in the "outside" world because of scarcity and non-accessibility of unattached, uncommitted (in a secular sense) people. But the Fellowship (and the word is capitalized deliberately) for which we faithfully pray and about which we glibly speak but which we too seldom actually experience within a *church* setting—this Fellowship is certainly at least approximated in the group relationships encountered in such summer laboratories.

Those who have been privileged to be there can no longer deny that it *can* happen here. It can because it did, if only for a fleeting three weeks. Death and resurrection, guilt and redemption took on experiential meaning. There are amazing resources (as well as lessons) within the group. The Holy Spirit can and does produce through a group what is less likely if not improbable through the individual. An intensive group experience seriously challenges the perpetuating of the monarchical set-up of the traditional parish. It suggests, for instance, quite a different kind of vestry or board meetings.

The therapeutic value of the group experience is very real. It is one thing to be bounced off (to describe it aggressively) another *person,* or to relate (to describe it more gently) to another *person,* but it is quite a different experience to be bounced off or to relate to *several* persons at the same time and in the same setting. Within the group one can learn at first hand *both* his strengths and his weaknesses. Hence he can achieve greater insight into himself and his relationships with others.

The whole movement, however valuable, is probably destined to suffer somewhat at the hands of zealots—and the writer may unconsciously be Exhibit A. But those less eager, more secure, possibly in less need, should not abstain from such strengths and insights as it can provide.

R.J.F.

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Eternal Life and the Aged

Nearly all religious world-views, and certainly Christianity's, include some kind of belief in life after death; it is often a faith in personal survival. For this reason the clergy have a vital interest in deepening and sharpening their understanding of the role of such beliefs in the personalities of those to whom they minister, and possibly the clearest light ever brought to bear will come from clinical studies of the aged in psychopathic programs and in geriatric services for groups and individuals. Classical studies of the questionnaire kind, such as James Leuba's *Belief in God and Immortality,* are of only partial, even dubious, value.

Mr. Taylor, in his paper "Pastoral Observations of Hospitalized Senile Patients," in this issue of the *Journal,* wonders whether "the lack of manifest concern with death and the after life may be a part of the general inability of these [aged?] people to face up to the fact of growing old." This raises the whole question of whether, in fact, people of advanced age do or do not generally concern themselves with eternal life; whether the factor of psychopathology (beyond typical senility) has any determining influence in the matter; whether it is true, as some depth analysis suggests, that people have a kind of built-in capacity to deal with the prospect of non-being by dying from the inside out, i.e., accepting non-being at an unconscious level first and "adjusting" to it as it becomes more obviously an objective and conscious consideration. Flanders Dunbar's report on longevity, to the Third Congress of the International Association of Gerontology in London last summer (*Time,* August 2, 1954), is an example of the results of opinion surveys among the aged. But here, in the question of the emotional and intellectual response of the aged to the prospect of non-being, lies an important sector where clinical diagnosis can contribute much light not only to pastoral care but also to the psychology of religion.

J.F.F.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

EDITED BY THE REV. ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

New Directions in Social Work: Edited by Cora Kasius; Harper, New York, 1954. 258 pp. $3.50.

What social welfare is, where it is today, and where it should be going tomorrow are timely subjects examined by twelve social workers closely identified with the broad concept of social services. Reflecting the spirit of Philip Klein, lately retired from the New York School of Social Work faculty and for whom the symposium is dedicated, the authors emphasize throughout that social workers should now turn from their pre-occupation with the adjustment of the individual to the study, diagnosis, and treatment of social processes or else the profession stands to lose its identity.

Throughout is implied the deep conviction that the social work profession has reached the crossroads in its development where it must choose the path aimed at effecting social changes and discovering and devising ways for the carrying through of improvements for the betterment of mankind.

Although the book is focused principally on the responsibility of social workers to the alleviation of social ills, the parish minister will be enabled to gain a general view of the extent and breadth of existing social problems. The authors, all in their own way, are convincing enough that the minister will be stimulated into thinking about the vital problems brought to him by the individual parishioner or by the group and to see their relationships to the external social problems of the environment, such as economic instability, lack of adequate medical care, cultural conflicts, poor housing, occupational hazards, inadequate school standards, and problems of the minority group.

All of the articles seem to fit into a general scheme although they were done without collaboration by the authors. The beginning reports are of a general philosophical nature outlining the motives and responsibilities of the social work profession. The history and development of social work thinking are presented briefly. Attention is called repeatedly to the increasing recognition and acceptance of the national government in helping with mass social problems. This concept is then traced and broadened to the international scene by other authors who hold forth the hope for a future of international social work.

Further, the report tells the social workers what they must do: interpret policy, encourage public support of government programs, determine and advocate sound fiscal policy, participate actively in administrative and operational procedures. A continuous evaluation must be made of the role of the private agency in light of the growing consciousness of public welfare responsibility.

Several more authors defend the right of the social worker for pressing for a national health program. In this connection the article submitted by

M. Davis gives an enlightening, comprehensive, and objective account of the needs and problems of medical care. Recognition was given to the thought that social work must find its proper relation to the social science field. Alfred Kahn gives an illuminating and critical report in his examination of what constitutes social work knowledge. This is indeed a most thought-provoking article, particularly in his pointing out that there is lacking in social work knowledge "a conscious systematic effort to synthesize available knowledge and to develop new knowledge on a scale that would characterize the field."

The question then arises naturally in the reader's mind: how could the social worker direct an aggressive approach to social welfare programs? Rather than answer the question, the remaining four authors discuss the many obstacles to the attainment of the goals. Principally these are: (1) inadequacies in social work training; (2) lack of common understanding of what is social work; (3) social work has concentrated more on the individual adjustment; (4) body of social work knowledge is still undefined and is mostly a borrowing from psychiatry and social science; (5) limited development of research methods.

This reviewer would add an additional barrier. In order to be able to do social planning, one has to know the psychology of the masses. We know mass psychology through the study of the individual. At this time we have not advanced far enough in our understanding of the individual. How are we going to translate this knowledge to group behavior if we are to stifle the growing body of practice and experience we now have in dealing with the individual? The future role of the practitioner was not mentioned but recognition was given to the many long years of experience needed by the social worker to acquire technical skills and knowledge concerning human behavior. It may be one thing to be able to formulate a blue print plan governing social problems but how to obtain mass acceptance may be another thing. Prevailing knowledge of group processes, or democratic processes and group dynamics have yet to be explored—all of these involve the additional complex human element of "feelings and emotions" which are ever-present and need to be understood and handled.

Altogether this book affords stimulation and provocative thinking to everyone, including the parish minister, who might well stop in the middle of the book to ask whether the symposium was intended for social workers only, inasmuch as there was little mention given to other professional groups in the community who are also concerned with the shaping of goals for sound welfare planning. As a social worker this reviewer would say that this book will not only be informative to other social workers but also to clergymen who are concerned with social problems and reform.

JENNIE CHING

•

Neurotic Anxiety: Charleen Schwartz; Sheed and Ward, New York, 1954. 120 pp. $2.75.

This book (which is an elaboration of a doctoral thesis) only serves to clutter and confuse the groping and sincere attempts to correlate religious ideas with psychiatric theory. In her efforts to clarify the misconceptions

about psychoanalysis in order to make it compatible and digestible to Catholicism, the author simply changes terminology, brings in the concept of guilt and sin in Catholic terms, and feels that psychoanalysis has now been made "acceptable." She succeeds in making it a useless, if not meaningless science to theologians, while certainly alienating those psychotherapists who already have preconceptions and prejudices about religion.

The book is a restatement of the essentials of Freudian theory. Having a Roman Catholic orientation, she approves and condescendingly gives the nod to Freud when his views either do not touch on Catholic philosophy or dogma or when they coincide. When Freud's ideas are opposed, she merely substitutes the proper concept and peace is made. It becomes a series of dialectical arguments based upon the essential weaknesses of Freudian theory, that is, his philosophical view of man, which the author (while disagreeing violently) strangely accepts with minor changes! As a matter of fact, she says Freud discovered the psychological basis for original sin and "for all his attack upon religion, becomes more Catholic than the others who assume man is capable of bringing about the normal psychological adjustment all by himself." Only a few corrections of Freudian theory apparently are necessary, such as giving up the unconscious elements in neurotic development, staying with psychoanalytic theory as if it never developed beyond 1920, and forgetting that analysts like Adler, Jung, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, etc., ever existed. By accepting every element in Freud's mechanical dualistic theorizing, the author attempts to reconcile elements in Freud's thinking by merely substituting acceptable terminology. Thus it becomes an *apologia,* and not a critical evaluation.

This reviewer believes that a scientific doctrine should be examined on scientific grounds. If the underlying philosophy is fallacious, major discrepancies will appear, invalidating some of the scientific observations. This process of examining Freud's philosophical substructure has been the major source of the newer developments in psychoanalytic theory. However, this has required a major overhaul of some of Freud's theories rather than an oversimplified, naive acceptance of his basic premises. The author's premise that neurosis is a moral issue has already been well established on firm scientific grounds, and it is unfortunate that she apparently lacks adequate familiarity with the work of Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, both of whom developed this conception along rational lines.

The book is disappointing in that it clarifies little except some of the author's ideas and unfortunately serves to discourage any mutual interest the Church or psychoanalysis might have in one another. It contrasts with another book by the same publisher (Nuttin's *Psychoanalysis and Personality*) which was reviewed in this *Journal* over a year ago. Father Nuttin's presentation deserves careful and thoughtful reading, while this book is superficial and disappointing despite its arresting title which, incidentally, never seems warranted by the content.

LEON SALZMAN, M.D.

The Religion of a Mature Person: R. Lofton Hudson; Broadman Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1952. 136 pp. $1.75

Despite a most promising title this book turns out to be very disappointing. The headings of the various chapters are nothing more than clever slogans and cheap salesman-like sermon advertisements, which have caused organized religion to have a low reputation, especially in the eyes of a mature person. Dr. Hudson does not seem to realize that it is in fact the *mature* person who will not bother to break through all the superficial and noisy slogans which burden the style of this book so heavily, in order to discover deep and inspiring insights about religion.

On the other hand, perhaps the author sought in this book to help the immature person to grow up in his religious life. If so, then his objective is defeated because the presentation compromises much too much in order to meet the immature on his own level instead of pointing out for him the goal of a mature religion and showing him the way he could really achieve religious maturation. One must either write for a mature person about religion in a *mature* way, or he should write for immature people (and under a more accurate title) putting more emphasis on the development of a vital faith.

HANS HOFFMAN

•

A Dictionary of Pastoral Psychology: Vergilius Ferm et al; Philosophical Library, New York, 1955. 336 pp. $6.00

This book appears to be an attempt to exploit the currently popular (and hence profitable) fields of pastoral psychology and of religion and health. Only one of the contributors is a recognized authority on these subjects, and one wonders why he was persuaded to participate in such a venture. The *apologia* in the Preface is unconvincing.

Many of the terms included in this so-called dictionary are so out of date that they are seldom encountered any more. While there are some articles of a definitive nature, in an extraordinary number of instances there is no definition at all but simply a referral to another word. In some cases the treatment is almost ridiculous. For instance under "hymns" one is told to see "symbols"; under "humor" the reference is to "child training" and "sermon." The inclusion of some words defies credulity. For example here are some "pastoral psychology" terms which are listed as presumably requiring definition: human efficiency, home, democracy, honesty, hard work, happiness, ability, advice, romance *ad nauseum.* On the other hand the term "pastoral care" is not even listed!

In this reviewer's judgment there is both pathos and deception in the publication of such a book.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

•

Before the Dawn: Eugenio Zolli; Sheed and Ward, New York, 1954. 209 pp. $3.25.

The Chief Rabbi of Rome, whose brothers were all murdered by the Nazis, became a Roman Catholic at the end of the war, in the midst of

claims and counter-claims as to his motives for doing so. These "autobiographical reflections" do not clear the issue whether he had deserted his people in the German occupation. Only a small part of the book deals with it. The greatest part deals with Zolli's understanding of his conversion.

The author was primarily a mystic as a boy, later as a rabbi, and eventually as a Roman convert. Suffering always preoccupied him. As a child, for instance, he was fascinated by the crucifix. After his wife's death he had a vision of the Christ. Zolli loved Jesus rather than believing in him; his conception of conversion is in Johannine terms of the Lover, Love and Beloved. His theology seems minimal and *ex post facto* (as perhaps theology always is, by nature). "A convert is a man who has died and has risen again." The great precedent cited is, of course, St. Paul's; it is *not* "infidelity" to Judaism. Yet a curious omission is any reference to Pius XI's *Mit Brennender Sorge*. Not much light, really, is thrown upon the Jew-to-Christian gambit.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

•

The Apocrypha, Bridge of the Testaments: Robert C. Dentan; Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1954. 122 pp. $2.25.

With the increased interest in Bible study there has arisen a greater awareness of and curiosity about the Apocrypha. Until now, however, there has been no really adequate guide to this significant collection of interim books which serve as a bridge between the Old and the New Testaments. Professor Dentan has filled this need in giving us this useful and attractive commentary enriched by the author's scholarship yet focused for the non-academic reading public. Here is a fruitful source of both spiritual nourishment and fascinating historical information. The style itself encourages reading, and the book is further enhanced by a helpful index.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

•

Social Structure: George Peter Murdock; Macmillan, New York, 1949. 387 pp. $6.00.

This volume, of recognized importance in the technical social sciences, is worth note in this *Journal* because of its pioneer work in the careful application, for the first time, of psychoanalytical insights by quantitative methods to a kinship theory of social structure. Murdock has developed seminal theories (such as Freud's *Totem and Tabu*) beyond anything done by J. C. Flugel or Abraham Kardiner. As Yale's most aggressive sociologist, the author has focused attention from time to time on such issues as the alleged incompatibility (psychologically) of the prohibition of extra-marital sexuality and modern life, as in his debates with Roman Catholic sociologists at learned society meetings. In this volume he develops a new conception of the incest *tabu*, not as to its psychogenic origins so much as to its ultimate source in the *social matrix* which shapes the psychic structure itself!

JOSEPH FLETCHER

Your God Is Too Small: J. B. Phillips; Macmillan, New York, 1953. 140 pp. $2.00.

The author, who is perhaps best known for his refreshing *Letters to Young Churches* (and less stimulating *Gospels Translated into Modern English*), has successfully tackled the very real problem of outmoded or outgrown concepts of God.

Realistically and sympathetically he starts where people are and reviews for and with them the acknowledged inadequacies of immature, arrested, or static ideas about God. Then he moves forward and suggests ways in which "we can find the real God for ourselves."

For those who would minister today to intelligent, sensitive, and inquiring minds this book will serve as a guide and as an example.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

•

The Study of Human Nature: David Lindsay Watson; Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1953. 262 pp. $3.50.

This in an interesting and provocative book on the importance of learning to read human nature for ourselves. The author, while critical of modern psychology, does not fail to acknowledge our debt to this relatively new social science. His primary emphasis, however, is on relativity, as opposed to the objectivity that science advocates.

The book is weakened by continual apologizing by the author for not doing a better job. Occasionally he moves far beyond the range of the average reader with references to such subjects as quantum theory and Heisenberg's principle. His vocabulary frequently includes unfamiliar words like "inchoate," "bionomic," and "geodesic." Despite these obstacles, however, the enthusiasm of the author for his subject is obvious and somewhat contagious.

J. FRANK SCHULMAN

•

Do You Want Inward Power? John Heuss; Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1953. 172 pp. $2.25.

This is a unified series of doctrinal sermons from the Rector of "the most famous parish in America," Trinity Church, New York. Dr. Heuss argues with grace, ease, and clarity for an orthodox interpretation of the major doctrines of Revelation, Creation, Evil, Christ, Trinity, the Church, Eternal Life, Resurrection, Grace; and the expositions are pleasingly personalized in terms of life situations at the level of the common man. The clear and concise form of the sermons will delight the hearts of homiletes, who know something of the goings on in the dismal area of doctrinal preaching.

The title sermon is among the best. It offers the timely reminder that there are conditions which we must meet to receive Christian Grace, because "redemption is not a banking term" and peace of soul cannot be gained "by expecting to find it through getting up in the world." This is good news to be coming from New York City, where in recent times there has arisen a heresy of secularized religion which offers salvation without repentance and promises success apart from the disciplines of the cross.

The main criticisms of the book will probably come from the philosophical theologians and the psychotherapists—if these persons read sermons! The discussion of revelation, which makes reason synonymous with deductive logic and finds the content of revelation in "certain verifiable historical events . . . described in the Bible . . . (and) the creeds of the Church," will make the philosophical theologians rock with agony; as will also the discussion of the problem of evil, which leaves out of account the vexatious facts of natural evil and calmly (but incorrectly) "solves" the whole problem by reference to man's misuse of his freedom. Other affirmations, like the Athanasian Christology, the hereditary conception of original sin, or the *ex-opere-operato* conception of the (seven) sacraments, will likewise become *causae belli.* The doctrinal content of the volume forms a neat little self-enclosed system carefully shielded from any empirical considerations which might cast doubt on basic creedal assumptions, and this is the unhappy circumstance which will bring the psychotherapists in alongside the philosophical theologians. They will want to know more about the interpretation of Grace which conceives the transformation of personality as a supernatural and miraculous restoration: Belief in Jesus Christ "acted on them like a magic formula." "Becoming a real Christian is like waking up suddenly and finding that you are a millionaire" (118, 121). True insight, without which there is no true reform of the personality, does not come so easily in the therapeutic relation.

These difficulties are perhaps an indication that the times are ripe for an open meeting of the therapists and the theologians of the two schools, orthodox and philosophical. There are many problems to be ironed out and it would be a long meeting. It might last a half-century.

EARL H. FURGESON

•

Wisdom, Madness, and Folly: John Custance; Pellegrini and Cudahy, New York, 1952. 254 pp. $3.75.

A manic-depressive psychotic who is widely read in the fields of psychology, philosophy, and theology wrote this book during his hypomanic states while a patient in a mental hospital. He tries to prove by numerous excerpts which he quotes out of context and misinterprets for his own purposes that he has a "heightened sense of reality." He sees himself because of his "lunacy" as "a better 'receiver' for unconscious influences and messages."

The book, however, is nothing more than the distortions and exaggerations of reality characteristic of the megalomaniac egocentricity and arrogance of this kind of patient. The author himself says, "I cannot place full reliance on my direct and immediate interpretation." But nevertheless he insists explicitly in many places on the validity of his concepts and conclusions. He has no ambitions to be "normal" and wants deliberately to be "mad." He only wants "to learn to adapt my 'abnormality' to the conditions of the world around me." That is to say he insists on keeping his distorted illusions and "lunacy" but yet act acceptably in order to stay out of a hospital. His book is an apologia *pro sua vita* which culminates in his theory of actuality, a confused collection of diverse quotations and his own ideas which show his inner confusion.

Contrary to Canon Greensted (who writes in the Introduction, "It is actually in line with a good deal that has been written in recent years under the label of Existentialism"), this book does not represent an existential philosophy because of its lack of reality and such representative statements about "lunatics": "Their dreams are just as true and 'real' as 'reality' itself. They are, in fact, 'actual'." The same holds true for his whole comparison between the mystic and the lunatic where the implication is that he is one of the great mystics though he sees the truth of their difference when he writes: "The lunatic cannot relate his visions to 'reality'; the mystic can." It is this mixture of true insights and distortions characteristic of the psychotic that can make this book so misleading.

One cannot fail to recognize that the author, though a clever intellectual, defeats the purpose of the book in the same way that he defeated—according to his own report (Appendix A)—his release from a hospital. He is able to bring his delusions under control for a limited time in line with his goal but they get out of control before the goal is reached. This is inevitable because of his insistence on the negation of the positive reality. "The Negative knows best" and is, according to him, the actual, that is to say the real.

This book could serve as an elaborate case history in the field of manic-depressive psychosis.

HANS F. HOFMANN

•

Making Sense Out of Life: Charles Duell Kean; Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1954. 156 pp. $2.50.

As the title suggests, this book is a bold effort. Mr. Kean says that today's problems can be stated meaningfully only in the language of Christian belief. This is so partly because both the problems and the Christian language are dynamic. Indeed, one of the perennial mistakes of man has been to attempt static formulations. The originality of this book lies in its constant interpretation of common problems in basic Christian symbols and the elements of the early creeds. A psychological interpretation as such is not attempted.

It is only with a very deep appreciation of what Mr. Kean is doing that anyone should venture a criticism. Few people would criticize the theology which is the book's major theme, for it accords with widely-held Christian belief, and in depth. Some difficulty in reading is caused by an occasional repetitious movement of thought. Marking the text liberally on first reading, and then rereading, is most rewarding. Fewer abstract terms and more pointed illustrations would have helped. Even so, this reviewer hopes that the influence of this book will lead others to make similar attempts to relate Christian theology more directly to contemporary issues in the many areas where problems are felt.

ROBERT A. PRESTON

Christian Deviations: Horton Davies; Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. 126 pp. $2.75.

This little book is an examination of ten modern cults and sects, ranging from Jehovah's Witnesses to Astrology, by a lecturer in Church history at Mansfield College, Oxford. His purpose is to defend the Christian faith by pointing out the doctrinal and philosophical errors of the movements he examines. Christians are "custodians of right thinking," he believes; and so it is their duty to point out how horribly untidy is the thinking of bizarre religious movements. Lacking any penetration into the emotional and sociological factors that lead people to join eccentric religious movements and accept "wrong" ideas, the book contributes little to an understanding of the movements discussed. Nor will it persuade any believer in astrology that the configurations of the planets do not control our individual destinies. But it may well give a tonic glow of self-satisfaction to a reader who is in complete agreement with the author from the beginning.

CONRAD WRIGHT

•

Roofs for the Family: Eva Burmeister; Columbia University Press, New York, 1954. 203 pp. $3.25.

This is a vivid account of the move of the Lakeside Children's Center, a home for boys and girls from broken families, from the inadequate building erected in 1887 to a group of new, carefully designed buildings on the same grounds. This exciting adventure is portrayed in terms of the inner experiences of the children to whom the old home represents stability. They approach this change with feelings of apprehension and uncertainty. The staff's insight into the children's predicament and their success in turning what was feared as a disaster by the boys and girls into steps in their growth help in the understanding of all children. The story is a warm and heartening one.

CHARLES M. STYRON

•

The Funeral and the Mourners: Paul E. Irion; Abingdon Press, New York, 1954. 186 pp. $2.75.

In recent years considerable progress has been made in understanding the psychological implications of grief and bereavement. To date, however, very little has been done to apply the understandings gained to the actual conduct of the funeral. This book deals with this problem, and lays the foundation for the development of more adequate funeral services. This is not a manual, but rather an examination of the principles involved in developing an adequate funeral service.

The author first notes that historically the Church has been present in the time of bereavement and that this is an area of life which is still largely in the hands of the Church. He then moves on to a review of the psychological studies which have been made of bereavement and gives a critical evaluation of them. His chief contribution here, in addition to a good summary of the psychological problems involved in grief, is to emphasize that in a real sense a person's reaction to bereavement is an individual matter. Any one individual may or may not have such emotions as guilt, hostility, or fear, and if

these or others are present he will deal with them according to his personal pattern of dealing with problems. This is a good brief evaluation of the psychological problems of bereavement.

The main problem dealt with in the book and one which has not been treated elsewhere is the role of the funeral itself. Funerals and the practices which accompany them are all too often instruments of denial of bereavement and efforts to prevent mourning. This study stresses the need to deal with death realistically, and it examines the various elements of the funeral service in the light of psychological health and Christian wholesomeness.

Each funeral is an individual affair. To prepare an adequate service, therefore, it is necessary for the minister to know something about the mourners, the meaning of the deceased to them, and their reactions to life's problems in general. For example, care needs to be used on choosing the scripture readings because a specific passage may have quite a different meaning for the mourners than its intrinsic meaning or what it means to the clergyman. Verses chosen to encourage may actually discourage; those chosen to praise God may stimulate hostility towards Him. Scripture chosen in terms of its meaning to the individual can be very significant in helping mourners to make a healthy adjustment to the world from which their beloved one had departed. Likewise other elements of the funeral service can help those who are bereaved to mourn and to be comforted.

The funeral service cannot take the place of personal counseling in the time of bereavement, but the clergyman who prepares his services on the basis of the principles brought to light in this book will greatly aid the mourners. Indeed, in preparing such a funeral service he will have already made a significant start on his pastoral ministry to those bereaved.

WILLIAM F. ROGERS

•

Evangelism According to Christ: Gaines S. Dobbins; Broadman Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1949. 224 pp. $2.50.

This volume belongs to the philosophy or theology of evangelism and is, for the most part, a homiletical exposition of the Gospel of John from the point of view of evangelistic principles and problems. The author accepts the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel and apparently also its historicity, including the historicity of such miracles as the raising of Lazarus. The point of view falls safely within the area of traditional theology: Christ is the Son of God and the Son of Man; he is able to save and keep those who come to God through him, and this saving power does not flow from his teaching or his character but from his death and resurrection. The process of salvation is doctrinal in character, the key doctrine being the Anselmic (substitutionary) theory of the atonement which "shines out from the darkness with clear light." Knowing the ease with which doctrinal approaches become doctrinaire, the reader will be grateful that the unfriendliness at this point is kept to a minimum, although one instance may be cited: "Historic Unitarianism and modern liberalism . . . stand as living witnesses to the impotency of Christianity without a risen Christ."

A generous amount of quotation from writers in the field of dynamic psychology and psychotherapy (Adler, Freud, Hiltner, Horney, James, May,

Menninger, Stolz, Wise) should not betray the reader into supposing that the insights of dynamic psychology are integrated with the philosophy of evangelism. Conversion, for example, is a "problem-solving experience" the classic description of which was given by John Dewey in his analysis of the psychology of the problem-solving situation! The unconscious components operating in conversion, and in sin, doubt, fear, are never identified if indeed they are thought to exist. The new psychology and the old theology meet in this volume, but they never mate.

The last chapter is probably the best in the book. It looks like a statement of conclusions drawn from the whole study. In reality it is an appendage unrelated to the main study, but containing some helpful and suggestive material. The suggestions that evangelism come to grips with the social and with the psychological implications of evangelizing are worth expanding into a volume, since, in the humble opinion of this reviewer, they represent the two main aspects of the soul-sickness of contemporary evangelism.

EARL H. FURGESON

•

The Springs of Silence: Madeline DeFrees; Prentice-Hall, New York, 1953. 173 pp. $2.95.

The author permits us to accompany her in her trip from the secular life to that of the cloistered. Now a religious in the Roman Catholic order, the Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, she relives her preparation for this transition and gives us vivid descriptions of her friends' reactions, shopping trips for clothes, etc. Her reasons for wanting to be a nun are not so strongly nor so convincingly presented as one would wish; however, the overall message, showing how self-discipline and divine discipline lead to the service which is perfect freedom, is well accomplished. A delicate sense of humor, at times quite specialized, may intrude rather often, but this does not impair to any great extent what the author has created for us.

Persons contemplating a similar vocation will find this book particularly rewarding; others will enjoy its pleasant, easy style and polite illustrations.

TENNEY KELLEY LEHMAN

•

The Theology of the Spiritual Life: Joseph de Guibert, S.J.; Sheed and Ward, New York, 1953. 382 pp. $4.50.

Father de Guibert held the important position of Professor of Ascetical and Mystical Theology at the Gregorian University, Rome, until his death in 1942. He was accustomed to issue notes to his students from time to time and these have now been put into book form and translated by Paul Barrett. A good bibliography of books on Ascetic and Mystical Theology available in English, together with comprehensive indices, are added at the end.

The scope of the book can best be indicated by describing the seven parts into which it is divided. Part One deals with the method and sources of Spiritual Theology, its character and terminology. Part Two examines in

detail the nature of Spiritual Perfection, dealing with such subjects as Union with God and the Imitation of Christ. Part Three is concerned with the work of the Holy Spirit and the discernment of spirits. Part Four considers man's part in cooperating with God and in particular the work of spiritual direction. Part Five is devoted to Mental Prayer, Part Six to the degrees of the Spiritual Life. Finally Part Seven examines the modes of prayer which are included within the term "infused contemplation," the actual experience of the presence of God within the soul; this part brings the book to a close with certain practical conclusions.

One can well imagine that such a book as this will prove of very great value to priests and seminarians within the Roman communion, especially as they prepare themselves for the task of spiritual direction. To the majority of Christians outside the Roman Catholic Church, however, the book will seem to move in a strange world. The intricate and detailed analysis of the human soul, its goal of perfection, the way of its attainment, the degrees of spiritual advance—all this has played little part in Reformed theology. Not that Christians of other denominations have been indifferent to sanctification or to the call to be perfect—as the history of Pietism and Evangelicalism clearly shows. But the approach has been simpler and more direct with a great emphasis upon the necessity for faith and obedience but with little concern for an exact analysis of the states and activities of the soul. Perhaps this is a field in which other Christians should be learning from the long study and experience of their Roman brethren. Even so, I doubt if this is the book with which to begin. It is a detailed textbook for those seriously studying Ascetic and Mystical Theology rather than a book of guidance for those seeking an introduction to the Catholic view of the spiritual life and of the way of its attainment.

F. W. DILLISTONE

•

The Spirit of Love: C. F. Kelley; Harper, New York, 1951. 287 pp. $3.50

Here is a book that deserves to be read again and again. It is a presentation, by a gentle scholar, of the diamond facets of Salesian love. Francis de Sales (who was indeed a saint), the topmost spiritual director for lay folk in the whole of 17th-century Europe, is here shown, through the chief of his writings, to be a man of charm and delicacy, and one whose insight and whose salty common sense would make him remarkable in any age.

On the one hand there were, during his fifty-five years of living, the religious, or professionals in matters of the spirit, who, by driving themselves to stupid or to magnificent extremes, had made experimental discoveries which have enriched the whole world. On the other hand there was that constant group within the Church which was seeking to live by a type of sentimental piety. Between these two, with roots deep down, drawing strength from the one side and sweetness from the other, and adding (for the chemistry of growth) from his own mid-ground much that is wholesome and rare, we have de Sales.

It might be said that he revalued human love, finding in it, in spite of theologies to the contrary, the very beginnings of the divine on earth. And with

this as point of linkage between man and God, he went on to give, by pen and by quiet example, and with startling and convincing detail, the way which human love must go if it would be transformed into its source, and find and bring salvation.

We, today, are in great need of such guidance and such vivid illustration, and there is no sincere person, be he Roman Catholic or Protestant, lay or cleric, who will not find in this book much to ponder and to absorb, and to give out again in the daily commerce of events.

The forward is by Jacques Maritain. There are forty pages of notes, many of which give in summary the results of long scholarship, or start one on a new and inspiring search. There is also a bibliography sufficient for months of important reading, and finally there is a name and topic index.

JOHN DIXON COPP

•

Plain Christianity: J. B. Phillips; Macmillan, New York, 1954. 87 pp. $1.65.

The author, already well known for his skill in setting forth the Christian faith in simple, relevant language, offers in this volume nine excellent sermons on how Christianity can work in the lives of those people who genuinely desire to live a more meaningful life. While the author directs his words to the layman, the parish minister will discover much to "read, mark, learn and inwardly digest." The book is an excellent demonstration of how to communicate the Gospel today.

FLORIAN W. CASSADY

•

The Image of God in Man: David S. Cairns; Philosophical Library, New York, 1953. 255 pp. $4.50.

Perhaps no other point of interest in the whole field of modern research holds such critical significance for the future as the nature of man. This is the empirical center where all science, religion, and politics converge today with inevitable and passionate necessity. Dr. Cairns traces not only the present contemporaneous estimates of Marx and Freud but follows the long trail through Old and New Testaments, the Church Fathers, Augustine, and Aquinas down to Brunner and Barth. The very breadth of such a treatment is enough to commend it.

It is obvious that the author has largely accepted Brunner's position, made famous in *Man in Revolt.* The earlier portion of the book dealing with Irenaeus, Clement, Athanasius and the pagan philosophies might well have been compressed or even given in somewhat longer form than the one adopted from Brunner's work in the introduction to Chapter XII. There might also have been some clarification of the various ways in which the terms "nature," "reason," and "logos" varied from age to age. This is equally true in later considerations of Luther and Calvin where the meaning of "will" shifts tantalizingly. In a work covering several millienia, the historical changes of content in certain words are of tremendous import, and unless delineated, old words are apt to appear lifeless, or, what is worse, tend to deceive us by assuming meanings of their modern counterparts.

The interpretation of Brunner, profoundly paradoxical, is argued against the background of the historic formulations of Christian tradition—particularly of Calvin—and in contrast to Barth's changing (seemingly contradictory) and yet highly suggestive work, especially as it occurs in the *Dogmatik*. An excellent chapter of conclusions restates the Brunner position in its dynamic, theological character. Certainly of all the theologians discussed, Brunner comes the nearest to presenting an existentially centered philosophy about the nature of man, with due respect for the findings of science in general and of psychodynamics in particular.

Following these careful analyses, the author considers the Marxian, Freudian, and humanist interpretations. Both Marx and Freud are respected in terms of their scientific findings, the first in socio-economic terms, the latter in individualistic and clinical terms. The speculative convictions of both, however, are vigorously questioned in reference to their de-theologizing of man. The chapter dealing with rational humanism offers no depth for rebuttal, and one could wish the space had been spent in dealing with the more sophisticated philosophy of logical positivism which is all too sparingly touched upon in its Freudian guise.

For the clinically trained pastor, this work will seem to have spent far too much time dealing with "speculative" theology of the early Christian era, and too little time in disclosing the dynamic counterpart of these ancient ideas. With Augustine or later, beginning with the Reformers, there is ample opportunity for a consideration of existential content as over against the formal concepts. One has the feeling here that criticism lodged against Marx and Freud could have been strengthened considerably by references both to a more sophisticated existentialism and its stress on ontological structures.

SAMUEL H. MILLER

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Children in Court: Helen W. Puner; Public Affairs Pamphlets, New York, 1954. 28 pp. 25 cents.

Mrs. Puner shows that the plan for caring for delinquent minors in New York City, like those of so many other cities, would be a good one if the ideal were approached. The weaknesses of the system can be summed up into the usual arguments of too few workers who are ill-trained in the beginning, too little money and equipment, political pressures which result in patronage appointments, and public apathy.

The pamphlet is well written for discussion groups or even for general information. It is free from political bias and emotional exploitation. Throughout, the emphasis is on what must be done for the child's protection, rather than on protecting society from the children. The job of the Children's Court, the author says, is to build character, not that of reclamation.

J. FRANK SCHULMAN

God's Miracle of Marriage: O. W. Stanbrough; The Christopher Publishing House, Boston, 1954. 51 pp. $2.00.

The author looks at marriage from the point of view of God as revealed through the Bible. His thesis is that marital unhappiness can be corrected by simply "trusting their case to God and obeying His clear and understandable word."

The argument, however, is weak, not because it is too specific and simple, but precisely because it is too vague and general.

All advice consists of quotations from the Bible, including many that would normally not have been thought to deal with the problems of marriage. The Rev. Mr. Stanbrough's approach is that of a strict fundamentalist theologian and thus has limited use for the many of different persuasions who seek guidance.

Adultery is discussed at length, but otherwise there is not even mention of the normal marital problems connected with mutual adjustment, raising children, sexual compatibility, and other conflicts. The most serious limitation of the book is that it seems to be an attempt, in the words of Milton, "to justify the ways of God to man."

J. FRANK SCHULMAN

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Dictionary of Mysticism: Ed. by Frank Gaynor; Philosophical Library, New York, 1953. 210 pp. $5.00.

In this collection of more than 2200 terms, we find that a great number of sources have been drawn upon. For example, Hebrew, Hindu, Buddhist, Babylonian, Moslem, Norse, Roman, Zoroastrian, Arabic, Greek, Egyptian, Assyrian, Celtic and even Eskimo. But with a few exceptions we do not find here those terms which have been the joints and sinews and the very life-blood of Christian mysticism. For instance, there is no place for detachment, simplicity, holy indifference, divine darkness, the wounds of love and spiritual marriage. The title of the book is therefore misleading. However, it does give many hard-to-find meanings, and it should have a place on the reference shelf of an accessible library.

In reading it one is impressed by the conceptualizing, some of it very old, which has been necessary in this field; by the sameness, even in subtleties, in the mystical experiences of unconnected peoples; and by the need for much experimental scholarship if chaff and grain are ever to be separated.

JOHN DIXON COPP

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The Rise of Methodism: Richard M. Cameron; Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. 397 pp. $4.75.

This volume is a comprehensive source book covering the beginnings of the Methodist Revival, through the year 1744. From the lengthy journals of Wesley, Whitefield, *et al,* as well as from letters, tracts, controversial pamphlets, theological treatises and sermons, the author (who is Professor of Church

History at Boston University School of Theology) has very carefully and wisely selected those parts of timeless value and has eliminated much of the vast bulk of material which now has lost its relevance since the generations for whom it was written have passed away.

The author has skillfully woven a continuous thread connecting these interesting and often exciting fragments into a unity by his "cementing" commentaries. The reader has a feeling of real continuity and sharing in the life and experiences of these first generation Methodists. While the book should prove very useful resource in all public and institutional libraries, it has minimal relevance for the parish minister.

RAYMOND W. ALBRIGHT

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Two Essays on Analytical Psychology: Carl G. Jung; Pantheon Press, New York, 1953. 327 pp. $3.75.

These two essays constitute Volume 7 of the Collected Works of Jung and were originally published in 1916. They contain much of the basic material from which Jung developed his later theories, and they serve to clarify some of the later formulations of Jung which are difficult to grasp.

When Jung severed his formal relationship with Freud, he had begun to develop the concept of libido to include other than the sexual instinct. Man was viewed from a broader framework, and his spiritual and higher ethical values were considered to be as basic as his sexual needs, and both were called "libido". Jung, however, retained the biological, mechanical, and philosophical framework of Freud. In some respects, it became even more rigid in Jung's hands, and the dualistic approach to man was elevated to the center of Jung's psychology. Personality became a problem of opposites, to be reconciled through therapy, which consisted of approaching and settling one's major archtypes.

Jung developed his theories in two directions. First, he saw man as being more than mere animal, thus viewing his higher spiritual activities as being other than sublimated sex instinct. At the same time he placed more emphasis on the Id and the remote unconscious influences affecting man's behavior. While it encouraged the study of myths as they affected man's development, it also stimulated the view of man as a developing individual, affected not only by his immediate past (his parents), but also by his remote past (ancestor and ancestor cultures).

His theories form part of the heritage of the development of the theory of psychoanalysis, and although current theorizing extends beyond Jung's ideas, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, *et al* are indebted to him. The Pantheon Press has done an excellent artistic job, and the Bollingen Foundation has performed a valuable historical service by publishing the Collected Works of this important pioneer.

LEON SALZMAN, M.D.

Christianity, Diplomacy and War: Herbert Butterfield; Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1952. 125 pp. $1.75.

In a short compass, with the same pithy discussion that Americans encountered in Professor Butterfield's earlier volume, *History and Human Relations,* he uses his vast learning to show us that even mere prudence should wean us away from "the heresy of war for righteousness." Like most Englishmen, Butterfield's conviction is that "ideological diplomacy" is useless to keep the peace, that communism (for example) will have to be out-thought, not out-fought. Pacifists will not like his concept of limited war, nor will cold-war addicts like his exposure of the Good-People-vs.-Bad-People myth. In this Cambridge scholar's view the worst evil, apart from the nihilism of nuclear weapons, is the cheap politicians' effort to sanctify diplomacy and military preparations in messianic terms.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

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Faith and Moral Authority: Ben Kimpel; Philosophical Library, New York, 1953. 186 p. $2.75.

The evident motive for this book's appearance is its author's desire to resist what the Germans call *Situationsethik,* the notion that there are no general principles that can validly and reliably be taken as directives in actual cases of moral choice. The Pope recently denounced this popular bit of ethical intuitionism, calling it "ethical existentialism." Professor Kimpel, of Drew University, takes his analysis directly and aggressively into the existentialist camp and comes off with several prizes, especially his demonstration that Kierkegaard opposed ethical systems not because general principles are worthless but because their advocates use them to remain uninvolved in actual decisions. Other philosophies, such as relativism and individualism, come under attack for the same reason that he opposes *Situationsethik.*

Reasoning that the common factor in all purely pragmatic moralities is individualism, Kimpel remarks rather shrewdly, "These philosophies, therefore, are not only explicitly anti-authoritarian: they are also implicitly anarchistic." On the side of pastoral care, readers of this journal (especially those drawn to "will therapy" doctrines) may be interested in the author's belief (p. 107) that A. A. Brill's claim that a psychiatrist can restore a catatonic *if* he has a "real desire to do it" is a therapeutic example of moral faith, and that the analytic procedures used represent examples of moral insight.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

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Sociological Perspective: Ely Chinoy; Doubleday, New York, 1954. 90 pp. 85 cents.

This is the second in a series of Doubleday Short Studies in Sociology. It attempts in fifty pages to present in systematic form the basic concepts, with illustrations, of sociology as one of the disciplines concerned with human conduct. On the whole it succeeds in avoiding those conceptual abstractions which obscure meaning, without ignoring the concepts themselves. As a succinct initiation of intelligent newcomers to the field, it is recommended.

The author is perhaps more optimistc than this reviewer about conceptual consistency among theorists and research investigators.

JOSEPH FLETCHER

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CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

EDITED BY THE REV. JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

"Methodology for Developing Self-Awareness," by Hyman Grossbard, *Social Casework,* Nov. 1954, Vol. 35, No. 9, pp. 380-386.

Mr. Grossbard, an Assistant Professor of Social Work at Columbia University, has written on the theme that teaching in recent years has shifted focus from the mechanical presentation of subject matter to a recognition of the dynamic interplay between subject matter, teacher, and student. This shift of focus "has increased the complexity of education enormously." The "primitive drive to growth" which motivates learning is in conflict with the resistance to the change brought about by learning. He conceives of the teacher in formal education as the intervening outside force preventing a stalemate. However, "when learning shifts from objective data to subjective phenomena" conflicts arising out of a change in the self-image "tend to neutralize the influence of the teacher."

Self-awareness is defined as "the link that connects observed phenomena —in himself and others—with his inner feelings." Self-awareness is essential in social work "in which the human being is our main concern." The social worker must go farther than subjective experience of human feelings: he must gain understanding of the circuitous process between feeling and expression of feeling, and achieve "some awareness of his own needs and the mechanism he mobilizes when he endeavors to help people," so as to avoid giving expression to his own needs rather than those of his clients.

The most important factors which interfere with the acquisition of self-awareness are anxiety and the resultant protective mechanisms. There are two general determinants for success or failure: (1) the basic structure of personality, or basic security; and (2) the individual's system of values on which his self-image is built. He asks the question, "How can an atmosphere that will be conducive to the development of self-awareness on the part of a student be created?" He states that self-awareness is an "incidental by-product" of teaching. When blocks to self-awareness fall within the normal range, "they should be considered pedagogical problems." He suggests as criteria for determining whether the blocks are within the normal range the extent of the limitation and the elasticity of the student's personality in developing new forms of expression and gratification, but recognizes that such a differentiation is often arbitrary.

He deals with the educational approach to self-awareness by citing a specific case and evaluating the possible approaches to the situation presented: the didactic approach which can be used in situations that are not

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The abstracts by Marian Barb, who is Secretary in Chaplain Bruder's office at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, are much appreciated by the *Journal.* They permit us to see into the learning of another profession through the "eye" of the profession itself.

too emotionally charged; the shock approach, tracing for the student his own struggle and mechanisms of negation, which "may produce a flash of self-awareness," but may result in an even more rigid reorganization; and the actual approach used, which was "a process of supervisor-student-client identification," which universalized the problem, alleviated the student's discomfort about his own mechanism, and created a "permissive" atmosphere. "As less energy is consumed in protecting one's self from attack and guilt, more psychic energy is available for learning, since it is the same energy that is used for both activities."

The supervisor's task is to deal with the outer manifestations of a need, rather than the underlying factors which created it, and the goals of supervision must not be confused with those of psychotherapy. He points out the deception in imitative behavior as a substitute for real understanding. A basic principle to be kept in mind is the homeostasis of the psyche. "In education, the student is able to face himself, and accept his limitations in learning, through identification with supportive teachers."

MARIAN BARB

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"Self-Awareness in Professional Education," by Gordon Hamilton, *Social Casework,* Nov. 1954, Vol. 35, No. 9, pp. 371-379.

This article by the Associate Dean and Professor of Social Work at Columbia University points out that self-awareness is essential to the professional worker in disciplines dealing with people. She states that self-awareness as such should not be a goal of professional education but rather a by-product of developing knowledge and skill. She breaks down social work education into three levels: *primary learning,* i.e. subject matter, processes, tools and related skills; *associated learning,* or the subject matter of related fields; and *attendant learning,* which she describes as the "'various attitudes, behaviour patterns, values and ethics which are essential to the development of the professional self." It is to this last level that Miss Hamilton assigns self-awareness. She says, "the person who is to be helpful to others must work out enough of his conflicts to be at peace with himself and must recognize to some extent how his own problems may interfere with his ability to help others." She feels the student's capacity for self-acceptance is a chief essential for developing self-awareness.

She points out that while self-awareness as such cannot be taught on the intellectual level, it can be stimulated on the level of conscious motivation and that the ability to communicate both ideas and feelings is essential. She suggests that inability to communicate may indicate a possible pathological deviation and might be considered a contraindication for a vocation dealing with people. She discusses briefly the resistance to learning found in neurotic students and their inability to appraise their own strengths and weaknesses. "It is important, of course, to distinguish normal fears in learning from neurotically fixed anxiety." She speaks of two levels of self-awareness. The first level, usually achieved during the first year of social work training, is expressed when a naive student "who loves people and wants to help them" begins to develop an identification with the profession and to accept himself in this role. He is able to participate in the criticism of his performance and

experience feelings about himself in relation to his clients. Finally, he "slowly begins to sort out situations in which his own problems do or do not block him in learning how to help effectively." She cautions that the student often resists the change in himself that comes with the shifting of his self-image, but that resistance does not necessarily mean that the student is a "problem." The second level is concerned with the student's awareness "that somehow or other he has got into his own handling of cases." What he tends to develop in the way of self-awareness is "acceptance of the fact that as a personality he has a certain number of unresolved emotional problems which may or may not get in his way." Miss Hamilton urged that psychiatric therapy not be regarded as the first or even the best solution for the anxiety aroused in this second level. Therapy may even become a form of resistance, although she recognizes that "for the seriously disturbed student, psychiatric consultation should always be sought." She points out indications of student-supervisor transference and countertransferance elements and the evidences of serious disturbance.

MARIAN BARB

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"What Is a Marriage Counselor?" by David R. Mace., *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic,* May, 1954, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 92-96.

Marriage counseling is old, the marriage counselor is new. Why has this new service figure appeared at just this time? What is his place in the service-system of society today? People are not satisfied with existing resources in which marriage counseling is a minor part of a profession such as the ministry, medicine, psychiatry, social work. People gladly resort to specialists in marriage problems. None of the existing professions have enough competence in marriage matters. The shift from agriculture to industrial urbanism has fragmented kinship groups which used to hold marriages together when in stress. Couples now prefer to take their troubles to an outsider. The demand for specially trained counselors will increase. It is an open question whether a new profession is maturing or existing services will manage to meet the need. Marriage counseling does not quite fit any of the four kinds of services: (1) it does not aim to relieve tension created by the environment, as do social workers, sociologists, and lawyers; (2) it does not tend the physical health of people, as do medicine and its satellites; (3) it does not resolve unconscious disorders of the personality, as do psychiatry and psychotherapy; (4) it does not help at the conscious level to gain understanding of oneself in relation to one's destiny, as do teaching, preaching, and propaganda. Marriage counseling involves some of all four forms of service; it is not a profession but a specialized branch of counseling which is a technique gaining wider use by all professions. If this was better appreciated there would be less antagonism toward it and less rivalry between the professions. Thus the American Association of Marriage Counselors is a cross-section of the main professions. The marriage counselor is a counselor plus. His plus consists of two distinctive qualifications: (1) he can deal with two specially related persons, at one and the same time, (2) he has an extensive knowledge of the marriage relationship.

J. F.

"Research Notes," edited by Paul Popenoe, *Family Life*, Jan.-June, 1954, Vol. 14, Nos. 1-6.

Since the end of World War II more than 30 million babies have been born in the U. S. Total births for 1953 (3,909,000) were the greatest in U. S. history. Most dramatic population change in the U. S. during the next decade will be the proportion of teen-agers. By 1965 there may be 25 million, compared to only 15 million at present. In 1900 there were 11 young people for every person over 65; today the ratio has become only four per elderly person. According to Sophia Kleegman, there are about 10,000 youngsters, mostly under 15 years of age, who were conceived by artifical insemination.

About 287,000, or one out of 12, white babies born each year in the U. S. may expect their fathers will die before they reach the age of 18. Widows are increasing at the rate of 100,000 per year. The average mother bears her last child at 27, according to 1940 figures. Frrom 1940 to 1950 the mortality rate in childbirth fell by three-fourths, from 34 per 1000 births to 8; by 1954 the rate is only 6 per 1000.

A new record was set this year of 33 million persons in America in school or college. In 1953 there were about 7 million who held college degrees. In 1952 the Census Bureau found nearly one million boys and girls 14 to 17 years old who had quit school, one third of them not even completing the eighth grade. In 1940 one child in 23 was working, mostly after school hours; in 1950 only one in 11.

In 1953 the marriage rate was lowest in two decades, possibly due to decrease of single persons after the marriage boom in the year after the war. Last year there were 1,553,000 marriages compared to 2,210,000 in 1946. The Census Bureau forecasts as many as 41¼ million married couples in the U. S. by 1960; in April, 1953, there were 37,100,000. The marked trend to earlier marriage is almost universal, even in Ireland, Sweden and Norway.

J. F.

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"Beyond the Surgeon's Skill," by Roger W. Barnes, M.D., *Sharing* (condensed from *California Medicine*), July, 1954, Vol. 22, No. 7, pp. 2 and 15.

Has the art of medical practice kept pace with its scientific attainments? Will doctors still go to a house at 3 A.M. without pay, help solve non-medical problems, minister to spiritual as well as physical needs? These things largely went out with the horse-and-buggy days. But faith removes frustration, fear, worry, resentment—all etiologic factors in disease. The doctor who believes in an overruling Providence is best suited to treat patients. "There is often a functional overlay in the presence of an organic disease and best results are obtained by treating both." The doctor's own faith helps patients with fatal illnesses, and it helps the doctor himself to be wiser in judgment and greater in skill. A surgeon cannot heal the wounds he makes; he depends upon a superhuman power for the results he hopes to achieve.

J. F.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Announcement is made of the organization of the National Academy of Religion and Mental Health. Under the direction of the Rev. George C. Anderson, the Academy will engage in research and education in all matters pertaining to religion and health, especially mental health. The Board of Trustees includes Iago Galdston, M.D., President; the Rev. Otis R. Rice, D.D., Vice-President; Edward J. Humphreys, M.D., Vice-President; the Rev. George C. Anderson, Secretary; the Rev. Kenneth W. Mann, Treasurer; and Paul J. Cary. On the Advisory Council are Kenneth E. Appel, M.D.; the Rev. Sankey L. Blanton, D.D.; Rabbi I. Fred Hollander; Gilles G. Leduc, M.D.; William C. Menninger, M.D.; Arthur P. Noyes, M.D.; Robert P. Odenwald, M.D.; the Rev. Albert C. Outler, D.D.; Lauren H. Smith, M.D.; the Rev. Paul Tillich, D.D.; and Erich Lindemann, M.D.

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A Workshop on Pastoral Care, directed by Granger E. Westberg, Chaplain of the University of Chicago Clinics and Associate Professor of Pastoral Care, will be presented by The Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago June 13-24, 1955. The purpose of the Workshop is to give men who are interested in the active ministry an opportunity to acquaint themselves with both the practice and the theory of pastoral care.

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In 1946 the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church initiated a Christian education program which may well revolutionize teaching in Sunday Schools and prove to be the forerunner of a completely new concept of the task of religious educators. The first published materials resulting from this program have just made their appearance for the 1955-56 church school year. They comprise courses for Grades 1, 4, and 7, and for parents. Further information can be secured from The Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut.

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The Rev. David A. Works, President of the North Conway Foundation, announces that an Institute for clergy of all faiths to be trained in the newest scientific and religious insights concerning alcoholism will take place from June 20-24 in North Conway, New Hampshire. The Foundation, along with the *Episcopal Churchnews*, will sponsor the Institute, which will be designed primarily for graduates of the Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies or its equivalent. The three major avenues of approach will be (1) the task of the Church, (2) the relationship of the Church to Alcoholics Anonymous, and (3) the relationship of the Church and community agencies. Ebbe C. Hoff, M.D., Ph.D., Medical Director of the Virginia Division of Alcohol Studies and Rehabilitation Program, will head the faculty. Among others invited are Selden D. Bacon, Ph.D.; Father John C. Ford, S.J.; Dudley P. Miller, Ph.D.; Bishop Charles F. Hall, D.D.; and John Park Lee.

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The Rev. C. Charles Backmann was formally installed as Director of Chaplaincy Services of the Lutheran Welfare Society of Wisconsin on February 20.